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  21.  Introduction 
 
The traditional discussion on industrial policy or Productive Development Policies (PDPs) 
in developing countries has focused on “whether” rather than “how” the government should 
be involved in trying to correct market failures that impede the efficient allocation of 
productive resources, goods and services (Rodrik, 2007). Melo and Rodríguez-Clare (2006) 
define PDPs as policies that aim to strengthen the productive structure of a particular 
national economy.
2  
In a broader sense, PDPs should be designed to improve the quality of the national 
business climate. As long as a sound business development and competitiveness 
strengthening process is created, market forces should play the central role in the efficient 
allocation of productive resources and productivity growth. However, upgrading 
competitive capacity and shifting factors of production is time and resource consuming and 
requires much investment. An active role of government could facilitate the resource 
allocation process. The debate on the case for targeted interventions is based on the 
existence of various kinds of market failures, which would justify the design and 
implementation of industrial policies, in order to enhance the productive capacity of a 
country. 
Generally speaking, Costa Rica has implemented PDPs for decades. For instance, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the country adopted PDPs based on industrial protectionism 
and the entrepreneurial state model. After the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, 
Costa Rica did not abandon industrial policy interventions, but its scope and objectives 
changed.  New PDPs shifted to the promotion of non-traditional exports to third markets 
(outside the Central American market), which implied a change in policy instruments, 
sector targets, and beneficiaries.  
Aggregate productivity (total factor productivity, TFP) growth is a key factor for 
sustained economic growth. The evidence suggests that on average, Latin American 
countries are underperformers in terms of TFP growth when compared to developed 
countries and other successful developing nations. Costa Rica is not an exception, 
                                                 
2   This definition includes any measure, policy, or program aimed at improving the growth and 
competitiveness of large sectors of the economy (manufacturing, agriculture); specific sectors (textiles, 
automobile industry, software production, etc.); or the growth of certain key activities (research and 
development, exports, fixed capital formation, human capital formation). 
  3notwithstanding its relative success compared to other countries of the region (Ferreira et 
al., 2008). Contrary to outstanding developing country cases (i.e., Ireland, Chile, the Asian 
Tigers) it seems that the sustained productivity growth impact of PDPs in Costa Rica has 
not been as strong as expected in order to catch up with global over-performers.  
This document evaluates the extent to which PDPs correctly addressed market 
failures. Additionally, an implementation analysis is conducted to identify possible agency 
problems and institutional coordination failures. It identifies possible government failures 
resulting from non-optimal or wrongly implemented PDPs. In this way, the study aims to 
contribute to a better understanding of how industrial policy should be undertaken in order 
to promote productivity improvements. 
Five illustrative examples of Productive Development Policies (PDPs) implemented 
in Costa Rica are presented. The study does not attempt to assess the welfare effects of 
those policies from an economic perspective. Rather, the main objectives are: a) to analyze 
whether existing PDPs are justifiable in terms of the market or government failures they 
address; b) to evaluate the public capacities to correct these failures (with a discussion of 
the adequacy of the institutional setting and agencies in charge of implementing these 
policies); c) to make a political economy analysis of the main forces and interest groups 
influencing the design and implementation of selected PDPs; and d) to elaborate a general 
proposal for policy reform and new directions for outcome improvements. 
The paper is organized as follows: after the introduction, Section 2 presents the 
general picture of PDPs in Costa Rica, describing the policies selected for this study. 
Section 3 presents a summary of the analytical framework. Sections 4 to 8 include the 
analysis of each PDP. The final sections elaborate the main lessons learned and conclusions.  
 
2.  Productive Development Policies in Perspective 
  
2.1. Recent Economic Growth in Costa Rica 
 
Successful PDPs should foster productivity and enhance economic growth. Growth in 
Costa Rica has been positive in recent decades, with the notorious exception of the 1980-82 
crisis (Figure 1). In addition, the general growth path has been erratic. During the 1970s, 
the country grew at an average annual rate of 6.3 percent, even taking into account years of 
contractions related to the oil shocks (at the beginning and the end of the decade) and low 
  4international coffee prices (during the mid-1970s). In the 1980s, growth averaged 2.3 
percent, while the 1990s experienced a higher rate (5.5 percent). After year 2000, economic 
growth has been slower (4.8 percent on average). 
 




















































































































Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
 
Taking into account the evidence cited above, a question that arises is: How do 
economies grow? The literature indicates two main sources of growth: factor accumulation 
and productivity growth (TFP). The first source includes physical and human capital and 
labor force growth. The second source includes technological progress (creation and 
transfer of knowledge) and efficiency improvements (the quality of the institutional 
framework). The same literature points out the higher relevance of productivity growth 
(TFP changes) compared to factor accumulation in explaining growth performance 
differences among countries (Caselli, 2005; Helpman, 2004; Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 
1997).  
Recently, Ferreira et al. (2008) show that in the last two decades (after the mid-
1980s), outstanding growth cases were mainly the result of productivity growth. In the case 
of Latin America, growth in the 1970-2000 period resulted mainly from factor 
  5accumulation (investment in physical and human capital).
3 Growth variance is explained by 
productivity changes. Thus, the evidence suggests a reversal of the relative importance of 
productivity versus factor accumulation in recent years, compared to previous decades.  
The evidence for Costa Rica indicates moderate performance in terms of 
productivity contribution to growth. Robles-Cordero and Rodríguez-Clare (2002) found 
that the Costa Rican economy showed average productivity growth rates of 1.6 percent 
between 1985 and 1990 (the period of major economic reforms and new PDP 
implementation), 2.7 percent between 1990 and 1995, and 1.6 percent between 1995 and 
2001.
4 
Using recent data, Jiménez, Robles, and Arce (2009) confirm those results and show 
a declining contribution of productivity to economic growth, on average, for the current 
decade. Historically, factor accumulation has been the most relevant determinant of real 
GDP growth for Costa Rica. Productivity growth has been positive but erratic. 
Notwithstanding, Daude and Fernández-Arias (2008) indicate that Costa Rica is one of the 
few Latin American nations showing positive productivity growth relative to other 
developing countries for the 1995-2004 period.  
When compared to leading technological nations, Costa Rica’s productivity is not 
converging. For instance, Ferreira et al. (2008) show that outstanding performers like 
Ireland, the Asian Tigers and Chile have been catching up in recent years to the United 
States, while Costa Rica has shown the opposite trend, similar to Latin America’s 
performance overall (Figure 2). These results are relevant, since, as explained in the next 
section, Costa Rica has been very active in designing and implementing PDPs. The 
productivity performance could suggest a limited impact of those PDPs for productivity 
improvements and fostering economic growth. 
  
                                                 
3 In the case of Costa Rica, Rodríguez-Clare et al. (2004) report a higher TFP contribution to growth in the 
1960s and 1970s (during the import substitution and entrepreneurial state years) than in the trade openness 
and structural reform period (1984-2000).      
4 The authors arrived at this result by deconstructing the growth rates of the Costa Rican economy during the 
liberalization period into three parts, corresponding to growth that could be attributed to accumulation of 
physical capital, the increase in the labor force, and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Other authors 
reach similar conclusions. For instance, Loayza et al. (2004) report a negative contribution of TFP for the 
1981-1990 period (-0.92) and 1.98 for 1991-2000. Rodríguez-Clare et al. (2004) report a TFP contribution 
between 0.12 and 1.04 for the 1984-2000 period (using three different model specifications). 
  6Figure 2. Total Factor Productivity Relative to United States 
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As stated by Noland and Howard (2003), “for selective government intervention or 
industrial policy to be welfare improving, policymakers must identify market failures that 
would provide the scope for welfare-enhancing interventions, design and implement the 
appropriate interventions, and correct or terminate the applied policy as changing 
circumstance warrant” (pp. 15-16). This study analyzes the design of PDPs in order to 
assess the extent to which these policies have correctly addressed market failures.  
This study will show that in Costa Rica, for the most part, government failures 
rather than market failures have been the main justification for PDPs. Even in the presence 
of market failures, the instruments applied in the policy design are not necessarily the most 
efficient (according to economic theory), but rather the most politically feasible options 
(lower political cost). Moreover, lack of policy evaluation and monitoring prevents the 
required adjustments and corrections of such policies in accordance with changing 
circumstances.  
  
  72.2. A Brief History of PDPs in Costa Rica 
 
The history of PDPs in Costa Rica is characterized by significant change over the past three 
decades.
5 The country followed an inward-oriented economic strategy during the 1960s, 
1970s, and part of the 1980s, restricting the imports of goods in order to protect local 
industries.
6 As a result, these policies created a significant anti-export bias that impeded 
technological change, production diversification, and the growth of exports to third markets. 
Together with the international economic problems that occurred at the end of the 1970s 
(second oil shock, high international interest rates, and debt crises), these policies led the 
country to a deep economic recession in the 1980-1982 period, with high levels of inflation 
and unemployment and overall poor economic performance. 
Costa Rica participated fully in the Central American Common Market (CACM) 
and the Import Substitution Industrialization Strategy (ISIS), placing high tariffs on imports 
of capital goods and manufactured goods and awarding “industrial contracts” that virtually 
guaranteed the profitability of the winners of those contracts. This particular model, its 
costs and benefits, have been thoroughly discussed in the development literature.
7 
Simultaneously, Costa Rica continued its agricultural export activities, mainly 
bananas, coffee, and sugar. It is worth noting that Costa Rica went well beyond the general 
characteristics of the ISIS. During the Oduber Administration (1974-78), the country 
launched an ambitious program for the development of a whole array of for-profit but 
publicly owned enterprises under the umbrella of CODESA (Corporación Costarricense de 
Desarrollo S.A), a holding company that at different times owned a sugar mill, a cement 
factory, an aluminum processing plant, and several other companies. The premise was that 
the Costa Rican private sector was too small to be able to compete with transnational 
                                                 
5 Rodríguez-Clare et al (2004) suggest five sub-periods of the recent economic history of Costa Rica: a) 
transition from the agricultural exporting model to the import substitution model (1950-1963); b) 
incorporation into the Central American Common Market (CACM): 1963-1973; c) entrepreneurial state and 
unsustainable macroeconomic policy: 1973-1980; d) crisis and stabilization: 1980-1984; and e) export 
promotion model and initial structural reforms: 1984-2000. Since the year 2000, export diversification 
through the attraction of FDI and the consolidation of Free Trade Agreements have marked a distinct period.  
6  This is known as the Import Substitution Industrialization Strategy (ISIS), promoted by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
7 Following Lerner’s Theorem (1936), Monge-González and González-Vega (1994) estimated that 66 percent 
of tariff protection granted to Costa Rica’s manufacturing sector during the import-substitution period was 
transferred as an implicit tax to the country’s exporting sector.    
  8corporations and could never achieve the size (production volumes) required to take 
advantage of economies of scale.  
In theory, businesses promoted under CODESA would be sold to the private sector 
once they matured. However, mismanagement of these companies resulted in massive 
losses, eventually transferred to the Central Bank. According to Fintra (1993), none of the 
public enterprises developed under the umbrella of CODESA reported significant profits or 
showed any important performance. Moreover, the original objectives of business growth 
promotion and employment creation were not achieved.  
A third leg of PDPs in the pre-crisis period (1960s and 1970s) was credit rationing 
and direct (nominal) interest rate controls by the Central Bank. The Central Bank controlled 
sector-specific credit quotas and interest rates through the public banks, which at the time 
had a monopoly on checking accounts and savings deposits and a virtual monopoly on the 
supply of credit to the private sector. 
At the same time, a large and complex system of agricultural price supports, on the 
one hand, and consumer goods price controls, on the other, was put in place.
8 The 
government built and managed a system of storage facilities and grocery shops, while 
“Price Inspectors,” working for the Ministry of the Economy, did their best to ensure that 
retail prices were not above the price limits. The agricultural sector was also the beneficiary 
of a technical assistance package managed by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Using the Inter-American Development Bank’s PDP combination matrix (2008), the 
group of PDPs described can be mapped according to their dimension and channel of 
intervention. Figure 3 depicts the classification in each quadrant. From a broad perspective, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, government interventions focused mainly on direct market 
interventions. Some of them were of a horizontal nature, while many others were vertical, 
favoring specific sectors and productive activities.  
 
  
                                                 
8 Corrales (1985) made an assessment of price controls and agricultural subsidies and concluded that those 
policy instruments were creating significant distortions that reduced welfare and affected consumers and 
small producers in particular. 
  9Figure 3. Costa Rica: Sample of “Old” PDPs (Implemented in the 1960s and 70s) 
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on IDB (2008). 
 
Unlike some other Latin American countries that tended to abandon PDPs in the 
1980s (the “lost decade”) in favor of market-based mechanisms, Costa Rica never did so. 
Instead, the country radically switched the orientation of PDPs to other instruments, sectors, 
and target markets. Therefore, PDPs were not really abandoned (in spite of all the rhetoric 
about reducing government intervention in the economy). Emphasis was placed on export-
oriented sectors and financial instruments, mostly in the form of tax incentives of different 
kinds, instead of direct price setting and other similar mechanisms used before the 1980-82 
crisis. The main changes experienced by the (old) PDPs described before were the 
following: 
 
•  Sale (privatization) of CODESA’s public firms (and cancellation of the 
program). 
•  The credit rationing system was dismantled. Interest rates were 
liberalized. In addition, the private banks’ participation increased, with 
access to checking and savings accounts management. 
  10•  The public sector storage facilities and grocery stores were closed; price 
supports (for producers) and price controls (for consumers) were 
dismantled. Notwithstanding these actions, significant import protection 
for selected agricultural products is still in place. 
•  The scope and activities of the Ministry of the Economy, formerly in 
charge of industrial contracts and price controls, were drastically 
reduced. Those contracts were eliminated. Currently, rice is the only 
product subject to a price control system. 
•  A new system of incentives to promote non-traditional exports to third 
markets (outside of Central America) was established. The purpose was 
to compensate the anti-export bias created by the Import Substitution 
Industrialization Strategy. 
•  A unilateral but not uniform tariff reduction policy was implemented 
starting in the mid-1980s. Since mid-1990s, trade liberalization has been 
driven by free trade agreements implementation. However, some 
activities are still protected, and price distortions remain (Monge-
González et al., 2005). 
 
In contrast to “old style PDPs,” the new ones emphasized economic incentives 
rather than targeting credit, providing technical assistance, or supplying specific public 
goods. Non-traditional exports received fiscal credits, the so called Certificados de Abono 
Tributario (CATs). In addition, special instruments were set for the tourism industry (such 
as tax exemptions on imported inputs and tourism contracts). Income tax exemptions for 
both non-traditional exports and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) exporting companies 
were established. 
It is clear that Costa Rican economic policy for more than two decades has moved 
decidedly toward ever-greater integration into the world economy. In the past decade, trade 
policy has been based on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The country has signed FTAs 
with the United States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Caribbean 
countries. The ratification of an Association Agreement with the European Union is 
expected in 2010, and negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with China are on course.  
  11Parallel to the export promotion strategy of the last two decades, the attraction of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a pillar for growth. The creation of CINDE 
(Coalición Costarricense de Iniciativas de Desarrollo) at the beginning of the 1980s was a 
key achievement. CINDE is a private organization dedicated to attract FDI and supporting 
the process of the new export-led economic model. A wide range of industries, including 
electronic components, electrical equipment, medical devices, software, chemical products, 
beverages and food preparations, tourism, financial services, call centers, have been 
growing and attracting significant foreign investment. 
While export promotion and FDI attraction are the most relevant policies developed 
in recent years, other PDPs have also been implemented. One example is PDPs targeting 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). During the Miguel Angel Rodríguez Administration 
(1998-2002), awareness of the need for a new type of industrial policy for SMEs (as well as 
the need to coordinate multiple programs in many different organizations with limited 
coordination) led to the creation of Programa Impulso, an attempt to integrate diverse 
programs, including: 
 
•  Programs to create linkages between high-tech multinational companies 
(MNCs) and local firms (Costa Rica Provee). 
•  Programs that provided financing and credit for SMEs. 
•  Programs that provided technical assistance and worker training (at the 
National Technical Institute (INA) and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology). 
•  Technical assistance programs directed by the Ministries of the 
Economy and Agriculture. 
•  De-regulation and business creation and promotion (red-tape reduction 
and regulatory improvement programs), administered formally by the 
Ministry of the Economy, but in practice with direct connection to the 
Office of the President. 
 
From another perspective, the Congress (Asamblea Legislativa) approved a 
Development Banking Bill (Ley Sistema de Banca de Desarrollo) in 2008, designed to 
facilitate access to credit by SMEs and coordinate efforts to supply other non-financial 
  12services to those companies. A national trust fund was created in mid-2008 in order to 
finance new entrepreneurial and investment projects. 
In the field of education, one specific PDP is worth mentioning: The National 
Integrated Technical Education for Competitiveness (SINETEC). This program is an 
initiative of the Ministry of Education, which started in 2001. The objectives of SINETEC 
are, among others, to make efficient use of resources for training and technical education, 
to promote new technical skills, and to create technical capacities required by high-tech 
foreign companies (MNCs). 
Focusing on innovation strengthening, another PDP, the PROINNOVA initiative 
(developed by the University of Costa Rica) is creating capacities to increase the licensing 
of intellectual property rights, with patents, utility models, industrial designs, brands and 
copyrights. In this way, some of the most important barriers to innovation can be overcome 
and, at the same time, a clear dimensioning of innovation efforts consistent with the 
economic environment and business demands might be pursued. 
In a different area, “food security” and agricultural support programs regained 
relevance in 2008, mainly because of the rise in international agricultural commodity prices. 
The discussion has been promoted mainly by the rice producers (through CONARROZ, a 
national organization that will be assessed later in this document). Old institutions such as 
the National Production Council (CNP, which managed grain storage facilities, a country-
wide set of grocery stores and agricultural price support programs in the 1970s and 1980s), 
have recently increased their operations. 
Figure 4 depicts the classification of more recent PDPs in each quadrant. Horizontal 
productive policies have predominated in the last two decades, both with specific public 
inputs (such as technical education) and market interventions. One of the most relevant 
PDP, as indicated before, is the promotion of non-traditional exports. 
  
  13Figure 4. Costa Rica: Sample of “New” PDPs 
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on IDB (2008). 
 
2.3. PPDs Selected for Assessment 
 
In this study, five Productive Development Policies (PDPs) are assessed. Figure 5 classifies 
them in each quadrant of the policy map. The PDPs selected are important for the purpose 
of this study since they are current policy priorities for the Costa Rican government. In 
some cases, significant resources are allocated. Additionally, there is an ongoing debate in 
the policy arena and academia circles regarding their institutional characteristics and the 
effectiveness of the responsible agencies. Reform proposals are being evaluated or 
promoted by the government. Moreover, while most of these policies are classified in a 
particular category, they do not only affect a narrow group of specific sectors or activities, 





  14Figure 5. PDPs Selected for Analysis 
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on IDB (2008). 
 
The main original arguments supporting these PDPs (to validate the specific 
government intervention), in principle, could have relied on the existence of specific market 
failures. On the other hand, non-failure arguments, such as egalitarian interests from the 
government (distributive policies), or political economy aspects (rent-seeking, vested 
interests) might have influenced the final policy outcome or determined the particular way 
each PDP was designed and implemented, and even justified. 
 
3.  Analytical Framework 
 
3.1. Market Failures and Government Failures 
 
A fundamental tenet of welfare economics theory suggests that when markets operate in the 
absence of friction, distortions and imperfections, no government intervention is needed to 
achieve a Pareto optimum (i.e., a situation in which no single economic agent or group can 
be better off without making somebody else worse off). However, when so-called market 
failures arise, the first-best outcome corresponding to the Pareto optimum can no longer be 
achieved through markets, and government intervention could be justified as a way of 
  15achieving an outcome as close as possible to the Pareto optimum (i.e., a second-best 
outcome). Pareto optimality, it should be noted, pertains only to efficiency and not to the 
distributive consequences of market competition (Baron, 2003). In other cases, the 
arguments for government intervention could arise from egalitarian objectives or income 
distribution policies (Cohen, 2001).
9   
Many arguments in favor of an active government role in industrial policy design 
(PDP design) rely on the existence (or at least the policy maker perception) of market 
failures. The main issue is how to design and implement effective policies (in terms of 
concrete and desirable outcomes) and avoid the common mistakes of the past. Rodríguez-
Clare (2005) argues that those policies should consider the specificities of the economy and 
address with precision the origin of market failures and the case for microeconomic 
interventions.  
Three specific arguments for industrial policy have received particular attention. 
One is derived from the presence of knowledge spillovers and dynamic scale economies, a 
second from the presence of coordination failures, and a third from informational 
externalities. Because of these market failures, the supporters of selective government 
interventions claim that there is a need for policy to adjust the structure of production in 
favor of sectors that are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth in a way 
that would not occur in the absence of such intervention in the market equilibrium (Pack 
and Saggi, 2006). 
However, selective interventions can be unsuccessful, while industrial policies can 
be wrongly designed. Two central arguments supporting this view are: a) the limited 
information and knowledge of the government to clearly address all details of an effective 
industrial policy; and b) political economy features (i.e., rent-seeking and other directly 
unproductive profit-seeking activities, DUPs).
10  
Pack and Saggi (2006) present a critical review of industrial policy arguments and 
conclude that the limited ex ante knowledge of the vast and complex information required 
to evaluate and compensate for market distortions can lead to wrong government 
interventions. In addition, Besley (2004) points out that even if there is a sound case for 
                                                 
9 When income distribution improvement or other specific social targets are the main arguments for policy 
action, the optimal political solution might be a Pareto suboptimum. 
10 See Bhagwati (1991). 
  16specific interventions in a particular productive sector (an “optimal” industrial policy), 
there are also implementation problems that should be considered. Rent-seeking and 
corruption, among other interest (pressure) groups’ activities, can separate policies from 
their original targets and expected outcomes. According to the author, experience suggests 
many “second-best failures.” 
Hausmann et al. (2008) argue that market failures are the rule more than the 
exception in developing countries. Those market failures demand specific interventions that 
have different impacts on some productive activities than others. The authors indicate that 
imperfect knowledge of specific market distortions (both from public and private actors) 
creates the need for an “identification” policy process. Industrial policies would (and 
probably should) result from this process. The formulation of an identification strategy is, 
however, a controversial issue. 
Like markets, governments can fail. Selected interventions and industrial policy 
could cause a more inefficient allocation of goods and resources than would occur in the 
absence of government action. A government failure can be defined as a policy choice 
leading to a distortion that prevents markets from reaching a Pareto optimum. According to 
Winston (2006), a government failure  arises when government creates inefficiencies 
because: a) it should not have intervened in the first place; or b) when it could have solved 
a given problem or set of problems more efficiently (generating greater net benefits). In 
addition, a government fails if it does not intervene to effectively correct a real market 
failure, or when the government action creates additional distortions (and redistribution 
effects contrary to original objectives).
11 
Since the 1970s, the Public Choice school proponents criticized the interventionists’ 
arguments based on the existence of market failures. Buchanan and Vanberg (1988), for 
instance, conclude that the politicization of a market failure is unlikely to generate the 
ideally corrective measures from a welfare point of view. One key reason is the existence of 
particular interest from the policy maker, far away from or contrary to the public interest. In 
addition, the final outcome from interventions is subject to the different actors (and their 
specific interest) involved in the political processes.  
                                                 
11 The government could also fail if, instead of aiming at correcting the real source of a market failure, it 
attempts to compensate the effects of that failure. 
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developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s: Failures of commission, such as   
unproductive state-owned enterprises (in the case of Costa Rica, CODESA is an illustrative 
example); and failures of omission (for instance, when the deterioration of public 
infrastructure, such as roads and highways, increases the costs of productive activities).
12 
Corruption is also a by-product of government failures. Government intervention can create 
corruption opportunities, rents for public employees, and misallocation of resources 
(Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). 
In spite of the sound arguments for precaution when prescribing selective 
interventions and promoting industrial policy, Rodrik (2007) argues that successful 
countries (South Korea, Taiwan, and recently China, for instance) have developed in good 
part due to the implementation of effective policies to overcome market obstacles and 
correct market imperfections. In this sense, microeconomic policies (PDPs) should not be 
seen as ineffective by definition, but their assessment should focus on the requirements for 
improving them and making them work effectively (Rodríguez-Clare, 2005). 
The design and implementation of industrial policy should be based on a sound, 
formal, and well-documented analysis, rather than ideological beliefs or a new development 
planning euphoria. Thus, two key questions will be answered to assess the effectiveness of 
market failure-correcting policies from the design point of view: a) Does the government 
have a good reason to intervene in a market (is there evidence of a market failure to 
correct?); and b) is the government policy addressing the market failure optimally? In 
addition, from the implementation point of view, three particular questions are relevant: c) 
Is government policy reducing (to some degree) the economic inefficiency (“dead weight” 
loss) from the market failure? d) Is government policy creating any government failures? 
And e) are the institutional setting and responsible agencies functioning adequately to 
achieve the intended goals? 
 
                                                 
12 Costa Rica’s road infrastructure has deteriorated significantly over the past two decades. This situation has 
been described as one of the main competitiveness constraints for the country. Rivera (2007) argues that the 
deterioration of road infrastructure is the result of reduced public funding and underinvestment for road 
maintenance and modernization. The origins of these problems are diverse and include fiscal constraints, 
limited scope for productive infrastructure public investment promotion, lack of effective private concession 
mechanisms, regulatory and institutional obstacles, and limited managerial capacity from key public actors, 
among other factors. 
  183.2. The Political Economy of PDPs 
 
Nolan and Pack (2003) argue that one notable vacuum in the industrial policy literature is 
the absence of sound discussions on political economy factors. Policies are the outcome of 
numerous forces operating in the political arena. According to Nash et al. (2006), the sum 
of those forces (interactions) constitutes the policy process, which is part of a wider 
political context that includes aspects such as the distribution of power, the range of 
organizations involved and their interests, and the formal and informal rules that govern the 
interactions among different players. For instance, interest groups invest in their stock of 
political capital to obtain particular rents from a specific policy (Winston, 2006).  
Industrial policies can result from a collective action process that involves a 
multiplicity of actors with different interests and objectives, in many cases with unequal 
negotiation and political influencing resources. Those actors interact in the public, private 
or civil society arenas. In order to assess the arguments in favor of an active role of the 
government and the design and implementation of PDPs, a political economy approach 
should be incorporated. In this way, the case for the existence of market failures and 
required public policy corrective actions should be developed from a broader perspective, 
taking into account the influence of the various actors, their particular interests, and the 
final outcome of the policymaking process.    
For this purpose, a political context mapping exercise is conducted, first, from the 
original perspective of each PDP; and then contrasting it with the current stage of the 
political mapping. This comparative analysis will serve as an input to assess possible ways 
to improve each PDP, taking into account the set of actors, forces, and the scope for 
reforms. Furthermore, the evaluation of the current stage of the political map will help to 
determine viable and realistic ways of promoting an effective reform for the PDP.   
To conduct the aforementioned exercise, the following steps will be undertaken: 
 
1.  Assessment of the justification of the PDP (identification of the market 
failure or government failure) 
2.  Political interests mapping: 
–  Actors in policy area;  
–  Priority of policy area for each actor; 
–  Actors’ reasons for exerting influence in policy area; 
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–  Degree of influence on final PDP design; 
3.  Assessment of the final design of the PDP, based on the political mapping 
4.  Analysis of the current stage of the political mapping to pursue effective 
policy reform  
 
Following Baron (2003), a Distributive Politics Spreadsheet (DPS) is elaborated in 
order to identify the main forces involved in the process of designing and promoting the 
implementation of each PDP selected. In this way, the ability to generate political action by 
opposing and supporting actors for each PDP will be identified, as well as the expected 
benefits from supporting or opposing (in this case, the magnitude and per capita 
distribution of benefits is evaluated). The incentive for a particular PDP is the main 
objective for pursuing supporting or opposing actions. The collective action variables 
(group number, available resources, cost of organizing) are also described. The main actors’ 
interests and their political influence determine the final policy design. The required 
information for the DPS is obtained through: a) interviews with key actors; and b) analysis 
of draft bills, discussions and hearing files in the Congress; and approved law, regulation, 
and policy documents.  
 
4.  Export Diversification and FDI Attraction: Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs) 
 
4.1. Origin, Evolution, and Main Actors 
 
The EPZ system is a set of incentives and benefits granted by the Costa Rican government 
to companies making new investments in the country (mainly MNCs). The most important 
incentive is the exemption granted on income tax up to 100 percent for eight or 12 years, 
and 50 percent for an additional four or six years. Other incentives include exemption from 
payment of all taxes and consular duties on imports, exemption from all municipal taxes 
and licenses for 10 years, and additional exemptions from payment of income taxes for 
those companies that after four years of operating under the EPZ regime make 
reinvestments in the country.  
In December 1981, the Law of Export Processing Zones and Industrial Parks (Law 
6695) created the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) regime as the first step in promoting the 
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are the following: 
 
•  Full exemption from income tax 
•  Full exemption from import tariffs (intermediate and capital goods, raw 
materials and other inputs) 
•  Full exemption from local taxes: sales, value added, municipal and 
royalties 
•  Free management of foreign exchange (export earnings) 
 
The main supporters of Law 6695 were the Export Processing Zone Corporation 
(CZFE was a public-private organization created under CODESA), Congress, local 
government representatives, and civil society organizations from Puntarenas and Limón. In 
fact, the CZFE proposed new text during the consultation process that was approved by 
Congress. The CZFE obtained public enterprise status and was responsible for planning, 
managing, and operating the EPZ regime. Initially, the Ministry of Finance (MF) 
established the preferential tax conditions, while the Ministry of Industry (MEIC) decided 
which companies could operate in EPZs. In 1984 and 1985, reforms to Law 6695 
eliminated the geographic restriction for EPZ creation (Limón and Puntarenas). At that time, 
it had not been possible to develop EPZs in those provinces, because of industrial 
infrastructure limitations. In addition, private developers of industrial parks lobbied hard to 
obtain incentives for other regions.   
A new reform to Law 6695 was proposed at the end of 1987. Three years later, the 
new reform became Law 7210 (1990), which allowed, among other things, market rent 
prices for industrial buildings located in EPZs, and granted the established fiscal incentives 
to service-exporting companies and traders (wholesale).  
The dynamism of EPZs and their increasing relevance in the Costa Rican economy 
contributed to the participation of more interested actors in the process of discussion and 
approval of Law 7210. The CZFE had a significant influence on the reform. The changes 
suggested by this organization were included in the final version of the Law. The Ministry 
of Trade (COMEX), created at the end of the 1980s, became another important supporter. 
In addition, local governments (municipalities) began to realize the potentially positive 
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speaking, the government increased its interest in EPZs because of the positive outcomes 
obtained in the second half of the 1980s. The Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, 
expressed concern about the fiscal burden of the EPZ incentives. 
Private participation in EPZs also increased. Industrial park developers gained 
greater political influence. The Chamber of Commerce was able to get commercial firms 
included in the EPZ incentives scheme. In addition, the Costa Rican Investment Promotion 
Agency (CINDE), a key private non-profit organization created in 1982, began working to 
attract FDI  and supported EPZ development.
13 Interestingly, however, opposition emerged 
from the Chamber of Industries, particularly because of the perceived bias in favor of 
foreign companies regarding tax incentives.  
The most recent reform of EPZs took place in September 1998, promoted by the 
Ministry of the Presidency and justified by the growth of the EPZs’ investments and 
exports, and the new type of FDI that was entering the country. The operations of INTEL 
began in 1997. Afterwards, the government became interested in attracting more high-tech 
MNCs as well as back-office and call centers. 
The reform was approved as Law 7830. One important change was the increase in 
the initial investment required for new applying companies. The main objective was to 
prevent national companies from shifting from the expiring export subsidies scheme to 
EPZs.
14 Another important change was the granting of EPZ investments to companies 
operating outside of the industrial parks (related to the experience with INTEL). This 
benefit was exclusive for companies with initial investments of over US$2 million and 
granted only in exceptional cases. This was consistent with industrial park owners’ interests 
and was related to the expiration of export subsidies. 
In the above-described reform discussion process, CINDE and COMEX had 
significant influence on the final outcome (Table 1). New actors such as AZOFRAS (the 
Association of EPZ Firms)
15 and the Costa Rican Trade Promotion Office (PROCOMER) 
                                                 
13 It is worth mentioning that since its creation, CINDE has been the most important actor in attracting FDI to 
Costa Rica. 
14 The export subsidies (Certificados de Abono Tributario, CATs) were coming to end at that time.   
15 AZOFRAS was created at the beginning of the 1990s as a result of the growth of EPZ companies, which 
wanted to be organized as a group. 
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actively supported the reform.
16 The Ministry of Finance agreed with the reform because it 
strengthened customs control and accountability. Additionally, closer coordination with 
COMEX facilitated the incentive management and monitoring process. Small political 




16 PROCOMER was the result of a merger of the EPZ Corporation (CZFE) and CENPRO (Center for Exports 
Promotion) in 1998.  
Table 1. Distributive Politics Spreadsheet: Export Processing Zones Law Reform (Law 7830, 1998) 
  Benefits from Supporting Ability to Generate Political Action Prediction





Supporting Interests              
COMEX   Competitive advantages to attract FDI High n.a.  Low High Low High
PROCOMER  Competitive advantages to attract FDI High n.a.  Low High Low High
CINDE  Competitive advantages to attract FDI High n.a.  Low Medium Low High
AZOFRAS   Competitive advantages to attract FDI 
(Efficient administrative infrastructure and 
trade logistics) 
High Low  
 
Low Medium Low Medium
Customs Agency (Ministry of 
Finance) 
 
Accountability of customs benefits for EPZs. 
 







Opposing Interests              
Chamber of Industries*  Benefits and incentives similar to those of 
EPZs.  
Non-discrimination (competitive 









Small Political Parties**  Sound ideological and political positioning  High  High  Low  Low  Low  Low 
n.a. = not applicable 
* The main opposition was against the differentiated treatment between EPZs and local companies, regarding taxes 
** Particularly left-wing parties 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on information obtained through interviews with key actors, Congressional archival research and literature review, adapted 
from an analytical framework proposed by Baron (2003). 
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 4.2. Institutional Setting 
 
Today, the Ministry of Foreign Trade (COMEX) is responsible for policy design, 
legislative reform, and coordination among public and private organizations related to EPZs. 
COMEX recently elaborated and submitted a draft law to reform EPZ legislation to 
Congress (Asamblea Legislativa). The proposal has been analyzed and discussed with 
various representatives from the public and private sectors, including business associations, 
labor organizations, and implementing and FDI promotion agencies. The current 
institutional setting of EPZ development is described in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Institutional Setting of EPZ Policy 
•  PROCOMER  •  PROCOMER 
•  CINDE 
•  Customs 
•  AZOFRAS 





COMEX: Policy Design and Reform 
Ministry of Finance: Policy Consultation 
Policy Implementation 
•  Chamber of Industries 
•  Chamber of Exporters 
•  Chamber of Commerce 




The main arguments for the proposed reform are: a) the current fiscal cost of EPZs; 
b) the limited productive linkages between MNCs and local companies; and c) the 
compatibility of some EPZ incentives with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. One 
key change would be the substitution of the income tax exemption linked to exports by a 
new fiscal incentive consistent with WTO rules (the so called green-box incentives). 
Additionally, the proposal includes new mechanisms to promote strategic FDI in sectors 
with high potential for linkage with the local economy and a new approach towards FDI 
promotion in less developed regions.  
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 Besides creating incentives for FDI, the Ministry also elaborates and manages trade 
policy. In this way, COMEX integrates foreign investment growth, trade creation, and 
access to new markets (through free trade agreements) as key objectives of the country’s 
global integration strategy. The Ministry of Finance is directly consulted for EPZ policy 
reforms because of the fiscal issues involved. 
The Costa Rican Foreign Trade Corporation (PROCOMER) is the implementing 
agency of EPZ law. It is also responsible for the administration and coordination of 
incentive contracts with EPZ operating firms, as well as new applicants. The corporation 
conducts accountability and control processes. However, it is not directly involved in FDI 
promotion activities. PROCOMER is a public-private organization. Its president is the 
Minister of Foreign Trade. Its board has three representatives appointed by the government, 
plus five directors from private business chambers (industry, exporters, commerce, 
agriculture, and small and medium enterprises).  
The Costa Rican Investment Promotion Agency is a private, non-profit organization 
responsible for attracting FDI to EPZs as well as non-EPZs. CINDE assists foreign 
investors in their site selection due diligence process (detailed information on the country 
and its advantages, and organization of customized investment agendas), and manages 
customized field trips and meetings with service providers, government agencies, industrial 
parks, and other key organizations. It also offers strategic advice on new operational 
expansion projects and product diversification. 
Several private organizations have influence on EPZs and play a role in the policy 
consultation process. The EPZ Private Association (AZOFRAS) is one of the most 
important private groups, which represents EPZ companies and developers. It is responsible 
for coordinating and interacting with public and private organizations related to FDI 
attraction. Business chambers play also a role in EPZ development, mainly through their 
participation in PROCOMER’s board of directors. 
 
   
  264.3. The Case for Policy Intervention 
 
The unilateral liberalization process that Costa Rica began in the mid 1980s was not 
definitive, that is, it did not conclude with a full free trade regime (total elimination of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers). Monge-González and González-Vega (1995) show that 
vested interests from pressure groups in Costa Rica were successful in limiting the scope of 
the reform. As a result, the anti-export bias caused by the ISIS was reduced but not 
eliminated. In addition, at that time, Costa Rica had a closed capital account and a managed 
exchange rate regime. The lack of efficient customs administrative infrastructure created 
burdensome procedures and red tape for business growth. In conclusion, without 
compensatory measures (fiscal incentives), it was very difficult to attract foreign firms 
oriented to exports to third markets (outside the CACM).   
Export Processing Zones emerged in Costa Rica as a mechanism for promoting the 
export of non-traditional products through the attraction of FDI, creating new employment, 
improving the balance of payments, and helping create a diversified product base. In short, 
this PDP pursued greater stability for the economy in the face of shifting terms of trade for 
its previously dominant exports (coffee, bananas, sugar, and meat) and imports 
(manufactured goods).  
The EPZ regime can be seen as a new government effort to offset existing 
government failures, but not a market failure. The most appropriate approach would be to 
eliminate those policies that created the original government failure situation. Thus, the 
PDP based on EPZs in Costa Rica imitated a free trade policy, compensating for adverse 
public policies.  
The extent to which inward FDI contributes to technological and knowledge 
externalities depends on a country’s trade policy (Saggi, 2002). In the case of Costa Rica, 
FDI attraction and export diversification have been complementary. Pack and Saggi (2006) 
argue that for a developing country, industrial policy is in many cases an outcome of the 
evolution of foreign trade and investment, which is consistent with the experience of EPZ 
in Costa Rica.  
Klinger and Lederman (2005) argue that economic growth in developing countries 
is related to the diversification of exports. In addition, economic literature points out that 
market failures, in the process of “self-discovery” of a country’s productive potential, are a 
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arguments raise the question whether EPZs have increased export diversification and 
supported the process of self discovering.  
The possible impact of EPZs on cluster development is worthy of analysis.
17 A 
cluster can be seen as a natural manifestation of the role of specialized knowledge, skills, 
infrastructure, and supporting industries in enhancing productivity. If the interaction from 
clustered companies improves productivity through technology or knowledge spillovers, 
positive externalities arise (if the activity of one company impacts the performance of other 
firms). This possible result could justify government intervention through the creation of 
incentives to attract FDI that entails positive externalities. However, the magnitude and 
type of incentives are key issues. Expected externalities should be contrasted with the 
amount of resources allocated for incentives, especially because of the significant fiscal 
burden related to EPZs.  
In all of the above-described cases, the main objective would be productivity growth, 
through technology transfers and linkage effects (spillovers) from multinational companies 
(MNCs), strategic FDI attraction (coordinated investments), and cluster development from 
groups of companies in relevant sectors.  
The analysis of the origin of this PDP indicates that there was no sound argument 
for intervention, since there was no evidence of the existence of a market failure that could 
justify government intervention (in the way that EPZs were created at the beginning of the 
1980s). Moreover, in that case, the optimal policy to apply was the correction (elimination) 
of government failures originated from ISIS policies implemented during the 1960s and 
1970s. In its origin, the creation of EPZs was not a second-best policy, either.  
However, as EPZs evolved over time, new arguments related to the positive 
externalities arising from FDI could justify government intervention. According to Pack 
and Saggi (2006), some of the key issues to be considered by policymakers are: a) the 
identification of which MNCs generate spillovers and in which local firms or sectors; b) the 
estimation of the size and impacts of those spillovers; c) the potential effects of FDI on 
local industry coordination problems; d) the identification of which local companies can 
                                                 
17  A cluster is defined as a geographic agglomeration of companies, suppliers, service providers, and 
associated institutions in a particular field. Those actors are linked by externalities and complementarities of 
various types. 
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requirements. In this way, a better understanding of market failures and whether and how 
FDI creates externalities on the economy will help the government to justify specific 
interventions and obtain support for policy reform. 
 
4.4. Policy Outcomes and Conclusions 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, EPZs have been very successful at attracting FDI. 
Starting in the mid-1980s Costa Rica saw increasing flows of FDI. Currently, FDI inflows 
represent 7.3 percent of GDP. Foreign EPZ firms’ investments account for 19 percent of 
total FDI. In addition, exports from EPZs account for 53 percent of total Costa Rican 
exports.
18 In the second half of the 1990s, the country recorded the most important inflows 
of FDI, mainly related to high-tech and off-shore services. 
At the macro level, FDI into EPZs has contributed to export growth, investment, 
employment, technology transfer, and foreign exchange earnings. Costa Rica has been 
successful in attracting high-tech FDI due to the cumulative results of past development 
policies (especially those related to human capital formation), geographical proximity to the 
U.S. market, zero profit taxes in the EPZs, and a specialized institution responsible for the 
attraction of FDI (CINDE). 
At the micro level, Costa Rica envisions that FDI will generate positive spillovers 
through competition and the transfer of technological knowhow, marketing, and business 
practices. However, a combination of pervasive market failures, government inaction, and 
changes in MNCs strategies explains why it has been difficult to reap the benefits of 
technological externalities from FDI in Costa Rica (Paus and Cordero, 2007). 
More sophisticated MNC branches may create backward linkages and thereby lead 
to the production of a larger variety of intermediate goods; in turn, this allows the economy 
to gain a comparative advantage in the production of more sophisticated final goods. In the 
end, the economy would end up with higher productivity and higher wages thanks to the 
backward linkages generated by MNCs. 
The actions of the different institutions related to the attraction of FDI do not follow 
a coherent strategy because they are not closely linked. This situation could limit the efforts 
                                                 
18 PROCOMER (2008). 
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EPZs might have reduced political pressures for additional reforms in key areas of the 
business climate, reducing the growth of potential FDI inflows.  
As a general conclusion, the EPZ regime has compensated for the anti-export bias 
and important competitive disadvantages, without creating any additional government 
failure. It is clear that this PDP was not justified at its inception based on market failure 
arguments, but rather by government failures created by the distortions originated from the 
ISIS strategy of development followed by Costa Rica for three decades.       
From a broader perspective, possible positive externalities associated with 
technological and knowledge spillovers from EPZ MNCs-branches are a new argument for 
policy interventions to correct possible market failures. To design and implement effective 
policies to exploit positive externalities associated with FDI, it is necessary to analyze 
which MNCs, sectors and productive activities have the highest potential for creating 
externalities. That is, what are the clusters with the strongest revealed comparative 
advantages and what channels and drivers for knowledge spillovers can be identified? 
Costa Rica has built an institutional framework that has contributed to position the 
country as one of the most successful nations at attracting FDI inflows. However, there are 
some concerns regarding existing coordination failures that must be addressed to improve 
this framework. For instance, the absence of government financial support of CINDE’s 
activities exemplifies the lack of a development strategy in which the government ensures 
that all the parts are complementing each other and moving forward in a coordinated way. 
Paus and Gallagher (2006) consider it critical that CINDE is institutionally embedded in the 
context of a larger development strategy, with sufficient resources to carry out its mission. 
It is worth mentioning that CINDE’s activities are focused on attracting FDI  and 
making specific business climate improvements (e.g., bilingual education), and less on 
other key tasks such as company monitoring and post-establishment services for MNCs. 
Government agencies are not fully addressing these services either. In order for Costa Rica 
to move faster to improve the business climate, Monge-González and Hewitt (2008) 
propose the creation of a national council on innovation, competitiveness and growth policy 
(NCICG) that must be led by the president. The experience of successful countries 
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required in order to advance key policy reforms (CEPAL, 2008). 
 
4.5. Recommendations for PDP Improvement 
 
The main recommendation for policy improvements on EPZ development are the following: 
 
1.  PROCOMER and CINDE should strengthen company monitoring and 
post-establishment services.  
2.  Due to WTO regulations, an adjustment of EPZ incentives is necessary, 
but the priority should be the improvement of the business climate to 
promote FDI growth.  
3.  Competitiveness improvements to attract more sophisticated FDI require 
the highest level of political will and support, which demands a sound 
institutional setting.  
4.  In this regard, a national council on innovation, competitiveness and 
growth policy (NCICG) should be created. In addition, inter-agency 
coordination with medium management representatives from CINDE 
and government agencies (such as PROCOMER, COMEX, and MICIT) 
is necessary to identify and prioritize the most important actions to 
enhance competitiveness.  
5.  The development of productive linkages should be a central objective of 
EPZ promotion. The estimation and monitoring of MNCs’ linkages with 
local firms should be improved. 
6.  EPZ development and cluster-strengthening policies should be integrated, 
taking into account the comparative advantages of the productive sectors. 
7.  The country should move to consolidate free trade, eliminating tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers.  
 
 
   
  315.  Technology Transfer: Backward Linkages between MNCs 
           and Local Firms 
 
5.1. Origins and Main Actors 
 
Since the creation of the EPZ regime at the beginning of the 1980s, the promotion of 
productive linkages has been the subject of public interest, due to the weak vertical 
integration of Costa Rican industry.
19 This situation was a result of the inward-looking 
strategy of development based on import substitution (ISIS) in the 1960s and 1970s, which 
promoted the manufacture of final goods rather than the production of raw materials and 
intermediate goods. 
The first efforts to develop local suppliers were initiated by the private sector 
(multinational companies, MNCs). Baxter Health Care, Inc., one of the first important 
MNCs established in Costa Rica, created a program of technical assistance for the 
development of local suppliers in the mid-1990s. This project was part of the firm’s 
business strategy in the country.  
In 1999, the Supplier Development Project for High-Technology Multinational 
Companies was created. This program was supported by the IDB and managed by 
FUNCENAT.
20 This PDP had as a general objective increasing the domestic value-added 
from high-tech MNCs and particularly to improve the technological capacity of SMEs to 
help them become indirect exporters to MNCs (local suppliers) and, subsequently, to 
export to foreign markets.
21  
One of the components was Costa Rica Provee (CRP), a National Supplier 
Development Office, which was transferred to the Costa Rican Foreign Trade Corporation 
(PROCOMER) in 2004 to give continuity to the program as a consolidated and well funded 
organization and, in this way, to promote indirect exports to MNCs. Costa Rica Provee 
detects the needs of multinational companies, identifies business opportunities, and 
recommends partner suppliers (that comply with the production, technical, and quality 
specifications and characteristics required by MNCs).  
                                                 
19 See File 7870 of the Export Processing Zones and Industrial Parks Law (Law 6695 from 1981). 
20 The High Technology National Center Foundation is part of the National Council of Rectors from public 
universities (CONARE). Besides FUNCENAT, the Directive Committee of the program included the 
Chamber of Industries, CINDE and PROCOMER.    
21 MNCs and SMEs were also part of the Directive Committee. 
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Costa Rica Provee turned into a more MNCs demand driven program, identifying 
the main requirements of inputs and raw materials from multinational companies, then 
matching MNCs demand with local suppliers.
22 On the other hand, it applied the concept of 
creating business opportunities through small projects between SMEs and MNCs.  
In the last decade, three important reforms to the EPZ Law related to linkages have 
taken effect (December 1999, June 2006, and August 2008). These changes have made the 
aforementioned mechanisms more flexible. The last reform introduced important changes 
in outsourcing mechanisms. The share of maximum outsourcing increased from 25 percent 
to 50 percent of total MNCs value-added, and the simultaneous contracting with different 
suppliers was permitted. In addition, the restriction of a maximum one-year contracting 
term was eliminated. Machinery and equipment were allowed to move outside EPZs so that 
local suppliers could integrate them into the production process. Additionally, red tape and 
burdensome administrative procedures were eliminated. Registration steps were reduced 
from 10 to 2, while approval time went down from 15-20 to 3 days. 
Table 2 depicts a distributive politics spreadsheet (DPS) with the different actors 
identified that participated in the design and implementation process of this PDP. It 
indicates moderate influence (effective political action) from most participants. Only 
PROCOMER and the Ministry of Foreign Trade (COMEX) had a high influence on the 
final design of the PDP, due to the amount of available resources, their capacity to exert 
political influence, and the expected benefits (related to the fulfillment of their institutional 
mandate). Only one opposing organization was identified. Interestingly, this organization 
was not against the objectives of the PDP, but its regulation. The Customs Agency 
criticized the flexibility of customs procedures to facilitate business between SMEs and 
EPZ companies, because of the potential loss of control and accountability. 
   One of the main conclusions of the DPS analysis is that the net balance of the 
different interests influencing the design of the PDP is very positive. Moreover, since the 
objectives of the linkage creation program discussed in the present section are consistent 
with the principle of improving the productivity of local supply companies, reforms to 
improve the present structure and implementation of this PDP would probably face little 
opposition. 
 
22 Almost all of the companies interviewed made this observation.   
Table 2. Distributive Politics Spreadsheet: Program to Strengthen Backward Linkages between MNCs and Local Industry 
  
  Benefits from Supporting Ability to Generate Political Action Prediction





Supporting Interests              
PROCOMER /COMEX  Market conditions for productive 
linkages 
High n.a.  Low High Low High
Multinational Companies (i.e. Baxter)  Local supplier programs at MNCs Medium n.a  Low High Low Medium
Local Companies (local suppliers)  New business opportunities High Low  High Low High Low




Low  Low Medium Low Medium
CINDE  Policy for productive linkages High n.a  Low Medium Low Medium
AZOFRAS  Policy for productive linkages High Low  Low Medium Low Medium
Opposing Interests         Medium   
Customs Agency  Limited accountability with tax 
exemptions
Medium n.a  Low Medium Low Medium
n.a. = not applicable 





 5.2. Institutional Setting 
 
Public and private organizations exert influence on CRP. Although this PDP is not a law by itself, 
it is governed by some regulations from the EPZ law. The institutional setting is described in 
Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Institutional Setting of CR Provee 
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PROCOMER is responsible for the design and reform of CRP, which in turn depends on 
the Ministry of Trade’s actions regarding EPZs regulations. The implementation, monitoring, 
and accountability of CRP fall within PROCOMER’s purview as well. Additionally, an 
important group of private and public organizations interact with CRP, with different interests 
promoting productive linkages between MNCs and local suppliers. Customs administration has 
been working on mechanisms to facilitate controls on trade between local companies and EPZ 
foreign firms. 
 
5.3. The Case for Policy Intervention 
 
The literature indicates that the impact of FDI on host-country economic development depends 
on associated technological and knowledge spillovers. In the latter case, such spillovers depend 
on vertical linkages, worker mobility, and demonstration effects between MNCs and local firms 
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 (Smeets, 2008). In the case of backward linkages, the existence of knowledge spillovers from 
FDI that generate positive externalities on local industry might justify government intervention.  
However, success in attracting high-tech FDI does not automatically lead to the 
generation of knowledge spillovers related to backward linkages. These depend on the MNCs’ 
interest in sourcing inputs in the host country and the domestic linkage capability of that country. 
Therefore, the case of backward linkage development must be approached both from the demand 
side (MNCs) and the supply side (local firms).     
On the demand side, there are various points to consider. First, the sophistication of the 
MNC-branch productive process. More advanced processes could create more and higher-value 
local linkages.
23 Second, corporate policies. In many cases, CEOs of incipient MNC branches do 
not necessarily pursue linkages with local firms. In the initial stages, facilities construction and 
operations start-up are central priorities. With respect to procurement policy, local procurement 
managers frequently look for global suppliers rather than local firms for security reasons 
(productive process robustness). Besides, local procurement managers usually lack knowledge of 
local capabilities (high costs associated with the identification of local suppliers). This represents 
an information asymmetry that limits local linkages (market failure). 
On the supply side, local firms are not necessarily capable of supplying goods and 
services to multinationals due to lack of firm-level capacity (entrepreneurship, technology, 
production scale, manageable risk, and financing). Even when local firms are competitive 
enough to become MNCs suppliers, host-country absorptive capacity depends on the learning 
infrastructure, institutions, and government policies (Paus and Gallagher, 2008).  
When taking into account the potential for externalities created by FDI, support for 
linkages between foreign and local companies can generate positive outcomes. That is, 
government intervention can increase the probability of realizing those externalities, since these 
are not automatically achieved unless local suppliers are effectively linked to MNCs.  
Technology and knowledge transfer entail different kinds of costs. Some of them could 
be covered by MNCs interested in increasing local procurement and technological cooperation. 
But the bulk of technology improvement investments might not be funded by foreign companies 
and could be out of reach of local companies.  
                                                 
23 If the requisite skills are available locally. 
  36Based on the previous points, a national plan to promote productive linkages between 
MNCs and local firms could be seen as a response to specific market failures (coordination 
failures among local companies) and externalities (from FDI). Thus, there are arguments for 
government intervention and implementation of a PDP.  
However, in the case of CRP, not all market failures are addressed. Currently, the 
program approaches only the information asymmetries between local firms and MNCs. That is, it 
helps identify the actual demand for inputs and intermediate goods by MNCs and it searches for 
possible suppliers (business matchmaking). This is an important task, but its full potential for 
business development (productivity improvement) cannot be realized unless other key issues 
such as the limited access to technology, finance, and lack of entrepreneurship are addressed by a 
national linkage-creation policy. In short, CRP is a PDP that does not optimally address market 
failures. 
 
5.4. Policy Outcomes and Conclusions 
 
Costa Rica Provee emerged as a possible response to information and coordination market 
failures. The targeting in attracting specific areas reflects the belief that coordination failures 
impede an effective cluster formation. However, the recognition of market failures did not carry 
over automatically to the development of an effective national linkage capability. Before CRP, 
three different programs to promote the creation of linkages were implemented in Costa Rica, 
but they were not properly coordinated or were mostly “paper tigers.” According to Rodrik 
(2004), policies to address such obstacles require clear rules of accountability, reciprocity, and 
enforcement. 
Between 2001 and 2008, the number of backward linkages registered by CRP increased 
from 1 to near 190. This represented US$0.8 million in 2001 and US$5.8 million in 2008. Groote 
(2005) found that only 17.3 percent of the linkages created by CRP were incorporated into the 
high-tech MNCs final product. Thus, more linkages were related to non-specialized inputs.  
Despite the positive results of CRP, the magnitude of its operations is very limited with 
respect to the size of the Costa Rican economy and MCN purchases. Total local purchases by 
MNCs in Costa Rica in 2007 amounted to US$591.1 million, while those promoted by CRP in 
the same year amounted to only US$4.4 million, or  less than 1 percent. 
  37The interviews of different key actors related to this PDP reveal that CRP is effective as a 
business matchmaker and enjoys the  confidence of both SMEs and MNCs. Nevertheless, its 
contribution to the development of linkages is very limited. Costa Rican SMEs face productive 
bottlenecks that demand integrated support to upgrade technology, financing, quality, human 
resources, and management practices, among others. In fact, multinational companies argue that 
an important obstacle for SMEs is their business culture (IDB, 2005).  
In short, more than identifying suppliers, the target of a sound linkage creation program 
should be the development of local suppliers. Costa Rica Provee falls short in its contribution to 
the correction of market failures. This point is validated by a recent study by Beltrán and 
Gutiérrez (2008), which identified several entrepreneurial obstacles in local firms. In addition, 
most local suppliers interviewed for this study indicate that the main obstacle to increasing their 
sales to MNCs is lack of financing, as well as limitations associated with certifications and 
human resource training. In all these cases, it is clear that there is a failure of coordination among 
SME-supporting agencies (CRP, PROPYME, public banks, and training institutions, among 
others). 
The work of CRP is important but limited because it does not help SMEs advance 
through the value chain and become global suppliers. A linkage creation policy requires 
mechanisms that not only correct information failures, but also address coordination failures that 
limit the development of clusters, market failures related to access to technology and financing 
by SMEs, and government failures to create an enabling business environment for those 
companies. 
There are various organizations in Costa Rica working with SME support programs. 
However, these programs are unconnected to each other and not demand oriented. A clear 
example is the lack of coordination between CRP and PROPYME
24 (a matching grant system to 
promote research and development (R&D) and other innovation activities) in order to support 
technological upgrading of local suppliers. Given this situation, these types of SME policies have 
little impact. This seems to be a government failure, since public organizations are not capable of 
achieving their original objectives. 
Costa Rica has been successful in attracting high-tech FDI, but its success has been 
limited in terms of capturing micro (vertical spillovers) benefits from high-tech FDI. The success 
                                                 
24 Based on a comparison between CRP and PROPYME beneficiaries, and interviews with local suppliers. 
  38in attracting growing quantities of FDI (such as in the Costa Rican case) does not automatically 
lead to the creation of backward linkages and the advantages of knowledge spillovers. 
 
5.5. Recommendations for PDP Improvement 
 
The following recommendations emerge from the discussion above: 
 
•  An impact evaluation of CRP should be conducted in order to assess the 
extent to which the program’s resources are adequate to undertake its mission 
and for future upscaling. 
•  Costa Rica Provee should establish closer coordination with agencies that 
manage SME support policies or programs (in areas related to finance, 
training, trade intelligence, and science and technology). Existing efforts are 
isolated and not demand-driven, especially in the education sector.  Technical 
institutes and universities programs should be aligned with MNC and SME 
labor skill requirements. 
•  A national strategy of linkage creation (integrated with FDI attraction efforts) 
is necessary, to move from the current “matchmaker” approach to an 
integrated global support model.  
•  In order to increase access to financing by domestic suppliers, CRP and other 
SME-supporting agencies should coordinate efforts with public and private 
banks and government organizations such as CONICIT. 
•  Unilateral trade liberalization should be completed in order to eliminate any 
anti-export biases that prevent local companies from increasing their sales to 
MNCs. Many local suppliers import a significant part of their inputs. 
Removing import barriers would help them compete with lower costs. 
 
   
  396.  R&D and Other Innovation Activities: PROPYME Program 
 
6.1. Origins and Main Actors 
 
The idea of supporting investment in R&D for SMEs originated almost two decades ago, with 
the Law on Promotion of Scientific and Technological Development (Law 7169) in 1990, which 
created the Ministry of Science and Technology of Costa Rica (MICIT). A decade later, in 2000, 
a new mechanism known as Financing of Technological Management for Industrial Change, or 
Grants Fund (FRC, Fondo de Recursos Concursables) was created. The objective was to 
promote R&D in SMEs (companies with less than 100 employees) and enhance management 
capacity and competitiveness. The FRC was developed by MICIT, CONICIT and the Office of 
the Presidency through a program known as Programa Impulso.  
The FRC was modified in year 2002 by Law 8262 (SME Strengthening Law). A new 
fund called PROPYME (Programa de Fortalecimiento para la Innovación y Desarrollo 
Tecnológico de las PYMES) was established to promote entrepreneurship and competitiveness of 
Costa Rican SMEs, through innovation and technological development, and to contribute to 
economic development.
25  
  The Economic Affairs Commission of the Congress advised that SMEs required an 
integrated PDP to enhance systemic competitiveness and correct several distortions resulting 
from obsolete infrastructure, burdensome red tape and business creation costs, wide interest-rate 
spreads, expensive public services, and an inefficient tax system. The Commission supported 
Law 8262 based on a study that pointed out critical obstacles faced by SMEs. In this context, and 
after reviewing the WTO Agreement on Subventions and Compensatory Measures (SCM), the 
Commission concluded that subsidies to correct evident market failures or those situations where 
high shadow costs exist (government failures) were allowed. 
With the creation of PROPYME, an inter-agency agreement was established, aimed at 
strengthening coordination among key public organizations responsible for SME policies and 
innovation activities. The transformation of FRC into PROPYME was an important legal and 
institutional improvement. According to Law 8262, PROPYME resources come from Costa 
Rica’s public budget and are allocated annually by the Incentives Commission at the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MICIT), and managed by the National Council for Scientific and 
                                                 
25 This program is based on the principle of demand-driven support. Therefore, it does not target specific sectors.  
  40Technological Research (CONICIT).
26 Such a mechanism attempts to avoid resource allocation 
distortions through political influence, corruption, or at least moral hazard and discretionary 
management.  
The system operates in two stages on a yearly basis (with two application processes). 
First, a firm or group of firms submits a project proposal to the Incentives Commission, which 
evaluates it according to the standard criteria. These are: the type of scientific activity or 
technological area the firm is involved in, the potential impact on firm and sector productivity 
and competitiveness, the scientific and technological capacity of the firm, the management 
capacity of the tender, and the probability that the firm’s requirement can be effectively met by 
the project proposal. Qualifying projects compete for a venture with a certified Research Unit 
(RU).
27 The RUs present their offers for the projects that qualified in the first stage. The winning 
offers are selected according to criteria of quality, capacity, opportunity, and conditions offered 
by the RU as well as additional criteria approved by the Incentives Commission.  
Once an RU is chosen to undertake a project, PROPYME may finance as much as 80 
percent of its total cost with a non-reimbursable grant, while the SME has to finance the rest of 
the project. The main idea is to stimulate entrepreneurship and invest more in R&D (learning 
what the SME is good at producing), given that the private profit of such investment lies below 
social returns (due to externalities). It is worth mentioning that PROPYME can only support 
SMEs that have been in operation for more than six months, thus excluding the possibility that 
these funds are used to finance start-up companies. 
The DPS for PROPYME indicates that this PDP was backed by an important group of 
supporters. Moreover, no opponent was identified in the analysis (Table 3). Supporting interests 
from MICIT, CONICIT, MEIC, and the Chamber of Industries were particularly strong. Indeed, 
MICIT and CONICIT directly influenced the final outcome of the Law, since their observations 
and suggestions were embraced by the Economic Affairs Commission of the Congress. The 
                                                 
26  The members of this Commission are the Minister of Science and Technology, three representatives from 
CONARE, one representative from the Ministry of Agriculture, one representative from the Ministry of the 
Economy, Industry and Commerce (MEIC), two representatives from the Ministry of Finance, one representative 
from the Chamber of Industries (CICR), one representative from CONICIT, and one representative from the Private 
Sector Union of Chambers (UCCAEP). 
27 The Research Unit (RU) may belong to either a public or private university from Costa Rica or abroad, as well as 
a private research unit independent from any university (for instance, a non-governmental organization or the private 
RU of a firm).  
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PROPYME fund is managed by CONICIT, while MICIT selects the projects to be funded and 
directs the resource allocation.  
The Ministry of Industry (MEIC) was particularly influential as well. Political 
negotiations with this Ministry helped to approve a revised draft law consistent with the 
arguments of MICIT and CONICIT. In addition, the Chamber of Industry (CICR) played an 
active role in the final design of the PDP. Allied with MEIC, they excluded agricultural 
companies from PROPYME’s scope so that the funds were granted only to manufacturing and 
services firms. In 2008, with the creation of the Development Banking System (Law 8634), 
PROPYME obtained additional funding to support companies from all of the productive sectors.  
Other key supporting actors of PROPYME were the research boards of public universities 
(University of Costa Rica and the Technological Institute of Costa Rica). Generally speaking, the 
objectives of this PDP have been widely supported by public and private organizations. 
Therefore, additional reforms and changes would be possible, and taking into account the 
relevance of PROPYME for productivity growth in SMEs, this policy could be adapted to new 
productive needs and a changing business environment.  
    
Table 3. Distributive Politics Spreadsheet: R&D and Innovation Support for SMEs (Law 8262, 2002) 
  
  Benefits from Supporting Ability to Generate Political Action Prediction





Supporting Interests              
MICIT  Availability of instruments to 
finance R&D 
High n.a.  Low High Low High
CONICIT  Availability of instruments to 
finance R&D
High n.a  Low Medium Low High
SMEs  Access to financial mechanisms to 
invest in R&D
High Low  High Low High Low
Private Research Centers  New opportunities for research 
investments and business growth 
High 
 
High  Low Low Low Low
Research Boards at Public Universities  Marketing of science and technology 
services for the private sector
High High  Low Medium Low Medium
Chamber  of  Industries  Availability of instruments to 
finance R&D 
High High Low  High  Low  Medium 










n.a. = not applicable 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on interviews with key actors, Congressional archives research and literature review, adapted from an analytical framework 
proposed by Baron (2003). 
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 6.2. Institutional Setting 
 
The Ministry of Science and Technology is responsible for PROPYME policy design and 
implementation. It is also directly related to monitoring and accountability activities. At the same 
time, the Ministry of the Economy serves as a consultative body. The MEIC elaborated the 
general framework of this PDP. CONICIT is also responsible for monitoring and accountability 
issues. 
Interest groups from the private sector and research organizations (both from public 
universities and private centers) are frequently contacting PROPYME administrators in order to 
propose changes and improvements to the regulatory mechanisms. The current institutional 
setting is described in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8. Institutional Setting of PROPYME 
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6.3. The Case for Policy Intervention 
 
When a firm invests in R&D and other innovation drivers, it generates knowledge that can be 
used by other firms. If a solid structure to enforce intellectual property rights is in place, money 
invested in R&D activities becomes the price of knowledge, given that those property rights 
allow the owner to exclude others from exploiting the new knowledge. However, even when the 
legal and institutional framework for intellectual property protection is in place, the innovator 
sometimes cannot fully own the benefits from its investment because of the presence of positive 
externalities due to technological or knowledge spillovers resulting from the innovation.  
  44The basic idea of technological spillovers is that the effects of innovation by one firm 
tend to spill over into the rest of the economy, mainly to other firms that interact with the 
innovating one (for instance, strategic partners, clients, suppliers, and even competitors). This 
situation occurs when an innovative firm receives private marginal revenue less than the social 
marginal revenue—when the knowledge the firm is generating is spilling over to other firms, 
thus increasing the benefits to society as a whole beyond a simple increase in the innovating 
firm’s profits. The only way for the innovating firm to obtain some part of the social marginal 
revenue would be through compensation for the innovation spilling over into other firms.  
While the effects of externalities can be seen as differences between private and social 
revenues or as differences between private and social marginal costs, the outcome is the same: 
the innovating firm is investing less in R&D than the socially optimum amount, which, 
combined with the convenience for other firms of acquiring new knowledge for free, collapses 
into a generalized underinvestment in R&D (Martin and Scott, 1998). In order to correct this 
market failure, government intervention is justified. The question that arises, therefore is, what 
type of intervention (PDP) should be followed? 
The classic theoretical argument is that the government should subsidize the private 
provision of knowledge either through tax credits on firms’ investment in R&D or grants to 
incentivize the private sector to undertake more innovation activities. It is worth mentioning here 
that subsidies of this kind are permitted by the World Trade Organization’s rules, since they are 
part of the so-called “green box policies.” According to Hausmann and Rodrik (2002), any 
government subsidy to increase the payoff for innovation should be reduced through time to 
impose discipline in the use of scarce resources.  
In the case of either export-related activities or production for the domestic market, tax 
credits for R&D investments are an interesting policy tool that may unfortunately generate 
resistance among developing country governments because of the costs involved. Martin and 
Scott (1998) point out that the effectiveness of tax credits may be limited because they do not 
benefit start-ups, but rather apply only to R&D investments made by already established 
companies. This is a serious limitation since, as stated by Monge-González and Hewitt (2008) 
for the case of Costa Rica, new companies (start-ups) are those that most frequently introduce 
new products to the market (innovations).  
  45Theoretical results from Arrow (1962) and Scherer (1967) suggest that more competition 
in a market should lead to greater levels of innovation and R&D investment.
28 Thus, policies that 
promote competition could incentivize private investment in R&D, since these help to overcome 
anti-competitive practices by incumbent firms and promote cooperative R&D practices. Trade 
policies are of particular interest for developing countries as well. Given that increased foreign 
competition and a larger variety of goods are made available to consumers by international trade, 
this creates additional incentives for firms to innovate more. 
According to Rodríguez-Clare (2004), R&D promotion policies by themselves will not be 
as effective as they could be if they were accompanied by a policy of promoting the creation of 
clusters of innovative business in areas in which a country has clear comparative advantages. In 
fact, the author states that the effectiveness of any general policy for the promotion of innovation 
is weakened by geographical and economic distance between businesses, as well as the way in 
which some innovations occur in such a way as to minimize knowledge spillovers. Isolated 
policies (such as subsidizing R&D or research in universities, for example) may therefore 
produce relatively weak and diffuse results.  
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the government has good arguments to 
promote R&D and innovation activities in SMEs because of market failures that impede an 
optimal allocation of resources. The correction of those failures is a necessary condition to 
improve the technological advancement of SMEs. In its current form, however, PROPYME can 
achieve only limited results. That is, this PDP is not addressing market failures optimally. 
 
6.4. Policy Outcomes and Conclusions  
 
Innovation investments or technology adoption processes can be costly and in some cases even 
prohibitive for SMEs. Numerous market entry barriers and internal business obstacles (limited 
managerial and technical skills, unavailability of advanced equipment, inefficient production 
process, and low quality standards) can impede the firm’s technological advancement. Without a 
coordinated government intervention, investment from SMEs in innovation or technology 
adoption might not occur at all.  
                                                 
28 This point has been reinforced by Baumol (2002), who claims that firms use innovation as their main approach to 
competing in markets. 
  46Between 2000 and 2008, PROPYME supported innovation activities carried out by 115 
SMEs.
29 The 115 projects represent a total investment of US$2.5 million,   averaging US$25,000 
per project. It is worth mentioning that some firms do not make effective use of all of the 
resources allocated to them.  For this reason, total disbursements account for 84 percent of total 
approved funds. The highest numbers of projects are related to technological development, while 
no patent-related projects have been financed. Similar numbers of projects have been financed in 
other categories, particularly human capital development. The absence of funded projects leading 
to patent registration constitutes a limitation for innovation and productivity growth.  
Currently, PROPYME is not contributing to correct market failures and promote R&D 
and other innovation activities for SMEs. Notwithstanding the availability of funds, the 
burdensome and complicated administrative process, limited knowledge of the program by 
potential beneficiaries, limited coordination with other SME supporting agencies, plus design 
problems (such as the exclusion of start-ups), create significant obstacles to achieving the 
program’s goals. 
The majority of managers from the Costa Rican companies surveyed were unaware of the 
program’s existence. Therefore, these firms were unaware of PROPYME’s financing instruments. 
Other companies indicated that they know about the program only indirectly because of 
information obtained from the Chamber of Industries. However, after learning what PROPYME 
does, the companies expressed their interest in applying and stressed the importance of these 
kinds of policies to overcome technological and human capital weaknesses.
30 
The results from eight interviews (four companies and four RUs that have applied for 
PROPYME’s funds) indicate that the application process is very complex. There is an extensive 
procedure cycle for selection of and disbursement to the beneficiaries (around six months), 
which reduces the attractiveness of the financing. As a result, medium and long-term projects are 
more attractive. 
Limited results have been achieved, in good part due to the poor coordination and lack of 
feedback channels between public and private organizations involved with PROPYME.  In 
addition, the program is not oriented towards creating synergies to strengthen clusters or other 
                                                 
29 PROPYME started in 2003, but the former FC program (original idea) started in 2000.  
30 Six out of nine companies surveyed that do business with MNCs were unaware of the existence of PROPYME. 
Two firms indicated they are planning to apply for a grant to finance quality certifications processes. From the 79 
projects funded by PROPYME between 2003 and 2008, only 11 were undertaken by local MNC suppliers.  
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projects. The work is not integrated with other firms with a high potential to generate positive 
externalities through knowledge and technology transfers, such as MNCs. There are no inter-
organizational coordinated efforts with other programs such as CRP. The failures of 
implementation, resulting from the complex application process and the burdensome and slow 
procedures, added to the limited marketing of PROPYME, are the result of a failure of omission. 
The main result is underutilization of the funds and underinvestment in R&D and other 
innovation projects. Thus, the policy is not contributing to correct market failures. 
One of the main criticisms of PROPYME made by the companies surveyed is that 100 
percent of the resources required for investment are not granted. This situation can generate 
difficulties such as delays in the research process or failure to achieve the initial objectives of the 
project. Another problem arises from the double application mechanisms, since most SMEs and 
RUs do not know each other.  
Despite its clear limitations, the companies surveyed indicated that PROPYME had 
helped them to become more competitive. One of the main benefits pointed out was the 
improvement in the productivity of the firms, especially from human resource training and 
increasing sales of its products. The majority of the companies that have obtained support from 
the program were engaged in innovation activities before, and have continued investing on 
technological improvements after PROPYME. Therefore, there is a potential for improvement to 
achieve better results from this PDP. 
 
6.5. Recommendations for PDP Improvement 
 
From a global perspective, the three PDPs analyzed so far should be integrated from a policy 
umbrella perspective, with the objective of promoting cluster development through FDI growth 
from MNCs located in EPZs, productive linkages between foreign firms and local SMEs, and 
technological innovations to strengthen local companies’ competitiveness. It is necessary to 
create coordination channels between industrial policies (PDPs) to achieve better outcomes. In 
this case, EPZ development, backward linkages promotion, and R&D investments should be key 
components of a national strategy to raise productivity.  
  
  48From the analysis, the following recommendations are offered: 
•  A comprehensive impact evaluation should be conducted of the agency and 
the beneficiaries’ performance in order to make appropriate adjustments and 
improve PROPYME’s outcomes. 
•  To increase the level of transparency of final project decisions, both applying 
companies and research units that are not selected should be informed of the 
reasons why their application was rejected. In this way, they can improve 
future proposals. 
•  A closer relation between SMEs and research units should be promoted from 
the beginning of the application process. 
•  A single application process should be instituted and applications should be 
accepted at least once a month, in order to increase the number of applications 
and accelerate project selection. 
•  Strong marketing and outreach efforts from MICIT and CONICIT are needed 
to increase general knowledge about the program among potential applicant 
companies. 
•  Integrating PROPYME with other PDPs such as EPZ development and CRP 
should be a priority for policy makers. 
•  A grants scale should be developed in order to incentivize additional funding 
from other sources (with a matching funds percentage for higher grants).  
•  The legal ownership of new processes, goods, or other project outcomes 
subject for patenting should be clearly stated in PROPYME’s regulations. 
Intellectual property rights from project participants should be clear. 
 
In order to address market failures optimally, PROPYME should be complemented with 
other policies, including: a) inclusion of start-ups as potential beneficiaries; b) coordinated 
efforts to ensure competitive practices within sectors of beneficiary firms and foreign 
competitors; c) elimination of any tariff and non-tariff barriers on imported inputs and capital 
goods required; d) development of capital markets; and e) focused incentives on companies 
belonging to clusters with revealed comparative advantages.  
 
  497.  New Productive Activities: Sustainable Tourism  
 
7.1. Origins and Main Actors 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Costa Rica has been able to create an international image as a 
biodiversity conservation destination through the development of an important nature-based 
tourism industry. Tourism promotion was another important component of the government’s new 
export-led strategy of development, implemented after the economic crisis at the beginning of 
the 1980s. At that time, the need to promote new productive activities to help increase foreign 
exchange earnings made policymakers focus on the promotion of international tourism services. 
  On July 5, 1985, the Costa Rican Congress approved the Law on Tourism Development 
Incentives (Law 6990), prompted by the need to generate foreign exchange and contribute to the 
country’s economic recovery. In the law’s two first articles, tourism is described as an activity in 
the public interest, with the objective of generating an “accelerated and rational” development of 
this industry.  
Six tourism activities were beneficiaries of Law 6990 incentives: hotel services, air 
transportation, car rentals, restaurants (with a minimum investment of US$50,000), aquatic 
transportation, and receptive tourism (for travel agencies dedicated exclusively to this activity). 
The majority of incentives were of a fiscal nature. To grant them, the Law 6990 established the 
following conditions: 
 
•  They must contribute to the balance of payments. 
•  They must create direct and indirect employment. 
•  They must use national raw materials and inputs.  
•  They must benefit other productive sectors. 
•  They must have positive effects on regional development. 
•  They must modernize and diversify the supply of tourism products in the 
country 
•  They must foster the growth of internal and external demand for tourism. 
 
Those incentives were in effect until 1992, when a significant reform took place. At the 
beginning of that year, the Congress formed a special commission to assess tax exemptions. On 
April 3, the Law of Tax Exemptions Regulation (Law 7293) was approved, which eliminated or 
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adjusted many of the tourism incentives.
31 Some of the most important changes were the 
elimination of income tax exemptions for new tourism businesses (with new tourism contracts 
approved by the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, ICT), the exclusion of restaurants as potential 
beneficiaries, and the change in Article 11 (Law 6990) that granted tax holidays to investors that 
invested up to 25 percent of their capital in tourism activities. 
In general, the tourism incentives bill did not face opposition. The main supporting actors 
for Law 6990 were the Ministry of Finance, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, and the 
Association of Car Rental Companies. The ICT had a determining influence on the creation of 
the law, since it strongly (and effectively) lobbied for the consideration of tourism as a “public 
interest” industry and the granting of incentives for restaurants. The Ministry of Finance 
prepared the initial bill and submitted it to the Congress. During the hearings and discussions, it 
managed to establish a maximum period of 12 years for the incentives.
32 The car rental 
companies supported the law, with a particular interest in the tax exemptions for national tourism 
rentals. Finally, the Central Bank was in favor of allowing hotels to manage their own foreign 
exchange (Table 4). 
 
 
31 This law eliminated or changed fiscal exemptions included in the whole regulatory framework of the country, 
with exemptions clearly stated. 
32 Consistent with the incentives period granted to exporters of non-traditional exports to third markets (outside 
Central America) at that moment.  
Table 4. Distributive Politics Spreadsheet: Law of Tourism Development Incentives (Law 6990, 1985) 
 
  Benefits from Supporting  Ability to Generate Political Action  Prediction 
  Main Objectives (Incentives)  Magnitude  Per Capita  Number  Resources Cost of Organizing Amount of Effective 
Political Action 
Supporting Interests              
Costa Rican Tourism 
Institute 
 
To declare the tourism industry of 
public interest and include restaurants 
(gastronomical activity) in the 
beneficiary group of tourism 
incentives. 
High High  Low  High  Low  High 
Ministry of Finance 
 
 
To have (next to ICT) the discretion 
in granting the incentives. 
To establish a maximum period of 
tourism incentives. 
n.a. n.a. Low High  Low  High 
Central Bank of Costa 
Rica 
To allow the hotels manage their own 
foreign exchange. 
n.a. n.a. Low High  Low  Medium 
Costa Rican 
Association of Car 
Rental Companies. 
To extend the benefits of car renting 
to national tourists. 
High High Low High  Low  Medium 
 n.a. = not applicable 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on interviews with key actors, Congressional archives research and literature review, adapted from an analytical framework 
proposed by Baron (2003). 
 
  527.2. Institutional Setting 
 
The Costa Rican Tourism Institute is responsible for the design of tourism promotion 
policy. Currently, its central goal is the promotion of sustainable tourism development, by 
maintaining a balance between economic and social outcomes, environmental protection, 
culture, and country assets. The current institutional setting is described in Figure 9. The 
ICT is also responsible for the implementation and monitoring of tourism policy.  
Other public sector organizations share responsibilities in this area. The Ministry of 
the Environment (MINAET), for instance, enforces national environmental laws, 
particularly in national protected areas and other natural assets. It also monitors the 
environmental performance of tourism companies. Local governments are responsible for 
policy implementation as it relates to territorial planning, infrastructure development, and 
public services at tourism sites. The Comptroller General is responsible for monitoring the 
policy mechanisms, especially tourism incentives. Private sector organizations, such as the 
National Chamber of Tourism and other business and professional associations, play a 
consulting and lobbying role in policy design and implementation. 
 
Figure 9. Institutional Setting of Sustainable Tourism Promotion 
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 7.3. The Case for Policy Intervention 
 
Tourism in Costa Rica has been a target of important incentives and direct government 
support. In the 1980s, the main mechanism of government support was fiscal incentives. 
Tourism was one of the new productive sectors promoted after the economic crisis. In those 
years, tourism was regarded as an infant industry with high potential. The country had 
plenty of competitive advantages (weather, natural and cultural attractions) but required 
incentives to correct coordination failures among companies and the industry as a whole. 
With fiscal incentives, the government tried to correct those failures and reach economies 
of scope, integrating different parts of the value chain. 
During the 1990s, most of the fiscal incentives were eliminated. The government 
began to promote a tourism industry based on the country’s distinctive characteristics in the 
world market, namely its cultural and natural assets, climate diversity, and peaceful 
environment. The goal was to create value through sustainable tourism based on the 
protection of natural resources. 
The term “sustainable tourism” is used to describe policies, practices, and programs 
that take into account not only the expectations of tourists about responsible natural 
resource management (demand), but also the needs and quality of life of the environment 
and communities that support tourism projects (supply). For tourism, sustainability is not 
only a response to demand factors of the industry, but an indispensable condition for 
successful competition and, even more important, for long-term business survival (Pratt and 
Rivera, 2004). According to Johnsen et al. (2008), sustainable tourism is, at its core, a 
management process. The important issue is to plan and shape tourism in such a way that 
the focus is not only on the economic implications of tourism but also on how it affects the 
inhabitants and the man-made and natural environment. 
Environmental quality is a pure public good, non-rival and non-excludable. In this 
sense, production and consumption actions that improve the use of natural resources create 
positive externalities and collective benefits. On the other hand, negative externalities such 
as air pollution, hazardous wastes leaking into water reservoirs, or deforestation (soil 
erosion) create higher social costs than private costs. The presence of externalities related to 
environmental management creates a case for policy intervention. Environmental policy 
attempts to internalize externalities and thus correct market failures resulting from natural 
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externalities by compensating with incentives (i.e., subsidies) in order to correct the 
privately determined market prices to reflect their social value (Cohen, 2001).      
In the case of tourism, policy intervention can be justified as far as the PDPs 
implemented promote the sustainable use of natural resources and therefore create positive 
externalities for society. Alternative less productive uses of natural resources (i.e., 
unsustainable agriculture) or possible depletion activities (i.e., housing construction) could 
be compensated for their opportunity cost with policy instruments that increase profitability 
for businesses and generate positive environmental externalities. Free-riding should be 
avoided with an effective performance monitoring and impact evaluation mechanism.  
Economies of scope in the tourism sector could also be achieved through PDPs, by 
means of clustering. High environmental quality can be used as a key input by those 
industries that pursue competitive advantages based on sound environmental management. 
In the case of tourism, the conservation of the natural capital of a country has a chainable 
effect and complementary influence on many firms. One advantage of clustering is the 
creation of backward and forward linkages. As stated by Cohen (2001), industrial policy 
can help create or strengthen those linkages to generate positive externalities.     
When promoting industries like tourism, a coherent policy is necessary to create a 
sound international reputation, a country brand that differentiates and positions the country 
competitively. According to FutureBrand (2008), “countries are becoming more aware of 
the importance of defining how they want to be perceived and the need to improve and 
leverage their assets. While tourism is often the most visible manifestation of a country 
brand, it is clear that the image, reputation, and brand values of a country impact its 
products, population, investment opportunities, and even its foreign aid and funding. 
Looking at a nation holistically, determining its key requirements and essential objectives, 
and aligning initiatives to both the public and the private sector are the best ways to create a 
successful country brand” (p. 8). 
 
   
  557.4. Policy Outcomes and Conclusions  
 
Tourism is one of the leading industries in Costa Rica. According to the Costa Rican 
Tourism Institute’s estimates, in 2008, more than 2 million tourists visited the country, 
generating US$2.2 billion. Taking into account the industry linkages with other sectors of 
the economy, tourism accounts for 13.5 percent of  GDP, 13.1 percent of total employment 
(direct and indirect) and 17.1 percent of total exports of goods and services (WTTC, 2008). 
According to the Central Bank of Costa Rica, FDI in the tourism sector reached US$325 
million in 2007 (BCCR, 2008).  
More than two decades ago, the country created a large number of incentives to 
promote tourism development, mainly tax exemptions and other fiscal incentives. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, some incentives were eliminated or adjusted because of new fiscal 
requirements. Since then, policy efforts have focused on the consolidation of a sustainable 
tourism sector, aligned with the most dynamic international market segments, and based on 
the country’s natural capital. 
There are three main drivers of success in Costa Rica’s tourism sector: a) value 
creation from the country’s image as a peaceful and democratic place, where natural 
conservation is institutionalized; b) a tourism industry with high local value-added, with an 
important number of small and medium-size businesses, development in rural areas, and the 
use of local labor; and c) the country’s brand name in international markets (“No Artificial 
Ingredients”) being a differentiated product (Pratt and Rivera, 2004; Santamaría and Pratt, 
2007). 
Positive externalities of environmental protection and sustainable tourism 
promotion have been addressed through different incentives, plans, and standards. For 
instance, in order to guarantee sound sustainable tourism businesses and create profits from 
the country’s green image (and limit free-riding from non-authentic businesses), a group of 
government, academic, and private sector institutions led by the Costa Rican Tourism 
Institute worked together in the late 1990s to develop the Certification for Sustainable 
Tourism (CST). The CST is a voluntary program that categorizes each tourism company 
  56according to the level of impact it has on sustainability, taking into account economic, 
social, and environmental variables.
33  
Notwithstanding the positive policy outcomes from these efforts, in recent years, 
there has been a dual approach to tourism development which is inconsistent with the green 
country brand and sustainable development objectives. Generally speaking, Costa Rica has 
been a leading nation regarding the green agenda environmental actions (biodiversity 
conservation, protected areas creation, and environmental services promotion).  
However, in spite of recent advances, significant problems related to the so-called 
brown agenda (inadequate water, sanitation, drainage and solid waste disposal, recycling 
services, poor urban and industrial waste management, and air pollution)
34 are present and 
require effective environmental policy actions (ICT, 2007; Programa Estado de la Nación, 
2008). All these contradictions regarding environmental management in Costa Rica affect 
tourists’ expectations about a nature-rich destination, and therefore erode the country’s 
competitive advantages. 
From a global perspective, environmental policy in Costa Rica is not addressing 
market failures (externalities) in a consistent manner. In the case of tourism PDPs, more 
coherence in terms of targets (location investments, development of specific areas for 
destination, national and local infrastructure investments) management (institutional 
coordination, impact analysis studies) and incentives (effectiveness, cost-benefit, and 
adequacy) is required to maintain sound competitive advantages.  
Ironically, in Costa Rica, investments in protected areas and national parks are low. 
Both public and private resources allocated to the protection of this key natural asset are 
                                                 
33  The CST draws on four assessment areas: a) Physical-biological environment. It evaluates interaction 
between the business and the surrounding natural environment, including the treatment of wastewater, 
protection of flora and fauna, management of solid waste, emission of gases, business practices relating to the 
natural setting, among other factors; b) Facilities and infrastructure. Aspects related to the internal systems 
and practices of a business are assessed in terms of waste management, use of energy- and water-saving 
technologies, the types of food and drink served, and training for employees in sustainable tourism concepts; 
c) Guest relations. Businesses are evaluated in terms of what actions management takes to invite guests to 
participate in sustainability policies relating to the natural surroundings and consciousness of the global public 
value of nature; d) Socio-economic environment. Identification and interaction of the establishment with 
neighboring communities are rated. For example, there is an assessment of the degree to which hotels respond 
to the growth and development of the region by generating employment or providing benefits that favor 
regional culture and well-being. 
34 These issues are reflected in the “brown agenda” since they are primarily related to pollution and urban 
growth. However, rapid urbanization also affects natural resource and use management in and around cities, 
causing pressures such as extensive depletion of water and forest resources and conversion of 
environmentally fragile lands, which are part of the green agenda (World Bank, 1997). 
  57scarce, when compared to the income generated by eco-tourism and the growth potential of 
the market (Pratt and Rivera, 2004). The National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC, 
for its Spanish acronym) consists of 166 conservation spots that cover 26 percent of 
national territory, including wildlife refuges, buffer zones, and protected areas and national 
parks. It also includes 2,654 private reservations, which constitute a significant burden on 
the government. A central problem is the limited budget for effective management of public 
and private lands that make up the SINAC.  
In addition, a sound territorial planning model is absent. Significant land use 
changes and weak environmental management have caused serious damage to coastal areas, 
buffer zones close to protected areas, and other important natural assets (Román, 2007; 
Programa Estado de la Nación, 2008). In this regard, tourism investments in massive 
resorts and hotels, integrated with residential projects, have impacted natural resources in 
several key spots along the Pacific Coast (Salas, 2008). The pressure on land and water 
resources, the generation of solid waste, and the destruction of coral reefs, wetlands, and 
other fragile ecosystems, for instance, are unwanted outcomes of tourism development that 
create serious threats to the industry’s development and the country’s sustainable 
development.   
There is no sound long term planning program, even for basic issues like public 
property concessions and infrastructure construction. For instance, in the case of the Golfo 
de Papagayo Tourism Project (GPTP), one of the biggest massive tourism business 
concepts begun in 1991, the Comptroller General has indicated that there are no monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms, and in many cases investments have been delayed for more 
than a decade (CGR, 2008a).
35 
Besides the leading role of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute, several public 
organizations are involved and responsible for various aspects of general tourism policies 
and incentives, and other key cross-sectoral issues such as territorial planning, water 
resources protection and management, construction permits management, and biodiversity 
conservation. For example, Román (2007) indicates that more than 10 public organizations 
(including ministries, local governments, and public administrative bodies) are involved in 
                                                 
35 Between 1997 and 2007, more than US$7 million of public funds were invested in infrastructure for the 
GPTP. However, most concessions have not been effectively used by the private developers. 
  58land use management for tourism projects. According to CGR (2006), only 18 percent of 
municipalities have adequate and updated territorial management plans. Most local 
governments in key tourism natural spots do not have the required capacity to conduct 
effective monitoring and planning, while limited coordination with ICT and other public 
organizations worsens the situation. 
 
7.5. Recommendations for PDP Improvement 
 
Tourism development PDPs should focus on business incentives for sustainable 
management. Incentives should be consistent with both environmental protection and 
value-added creation. Market trends and competitive advantages need to be mutually 
reinforced. Currently, the public and private sectors face the challenge of promoting and 
managing tourism potential in order to offer opportunities for both local and foreign 
investment, create employment, and increase revenues while ensuring environmental and 
social sustainability.  
The following recommendations are intended to contribute to the improvement of 
tourism PDPs: 
•  Public and private investment should be increased in those assets most 
critical for tourism attraction to bring them up to world-class levels. 
Natural attractions (especially national parks and coastal zones) and 
cultural attractions (particularly historic areas) are the country’s most 
valuable assets for tourism development. The tourism cluster must 
become actively engaged in environmental management and 
conservation. Active collaboration with the public sector and community 
organizations will strengthen competitive position for the entire cluster. 
Direct investment in parks, protected areas, coastal areas, and wildlife 
protection would provide significant returns. 
•  Tourism promotion organizations and resource management agencies 
should link tourism products (parks, protected areas, and cultural sites) 
more closely with marketing positions. This will ensure a consistent and 
unique selling position in world tourism markets based on high-value 
experiences at natural and cultural sites in a compact geographic area.  
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companies, etc.) with Certificates of Sustainable Tourism (CST) is a key 
medium-term objective to accomplish. The CST should be the general 
industry and government standard for tourism certification. A program 
to support companies to make necessary productive or management 
adjustments to adopt the CST could be coordinated with other 
productive strengthening programs. An evaluation of the possibility of 
making the CST a compulsory requirement for tourism companies 
should be conducted. 
•  Cruise ship and other massive tourism segments must be clearly 
dimensioned and carefully planned, in order to take advantage of their 
significant growth and potential, but with a clear understanding and 
effective management of their environmental risks. The competitive 
position of the country in the environmental and cultural segments could 
be threatened by the negative impacts of massive traditional enclave-like 
tourism or cruise tourism.  
•  All public, private, and civil society stakeholders should decide on the 
kind of tourism cluster they want to consolidate in the next decade, 
considering the possible impacts on the natural resource base and the 
development opportunities for the country. The actual level of 
institutional coordination among key public actors is not optimal. In 
addition, enforcement of environmental regulations is still limited. More 
efforts are required to create a sound institutional framework. 
•  There is a need to conduct periodic evaluations and impact analysis of 
tourism incentives, from an economic, social, and environmental 
perspective. 
 
   
  608.  Food Security and Agricultural Protection: The Case of Rice 
 
8.1. Origins and Main Actors 
 
In May 2002, the Rice Corporation (CONARROZ) was created (as a non-governmental 
public enterprise managed by a board of producers, millers, and government 
representatives), with the objective of managing a hedge fund to support the local producers’ 
prices margins and promote competitiveness-enhancing projects. The premise was the need 
for a mechanism to protect national producers from adverse (low) international prices and 
improve their local production conditions (low competitiveness).  
In addition, the argument of national food security, and more precisely, food self-
sufficiency, was raised. Rice producers and millers argued that Costa Rica should keep its 
tariff and non-tariff protection for rice imports intact. Thus, both objectives of rice self-
sufficiency and national producers support would be achieved.  
CONARROZ had its roots in the former Rice Office (Oficina del Arroz), created by 
Law 7014 in 1985. This organization was conceived with the aim of establishing a 
corporate relations scheme between rice producers and processors, to guarantee a rational 
and equitable participation of both actors in the industry, consistent with the interests of the 
most important food product in the nation’s diet. The Rice Office regulated the entire 
industry. It managed production and inventories, import quotas, and rice exports and 
imports, and guaranteed the purchase of all local production.  Nonetheless, imports of rice 
were open to third parties.
36 
In 1999, the rice producers proposed a group of improvements to the Rice Office 
law, in order to meet the new needs of producers, millers, and consumers. The proposal 
took a systemic approach, aiming at regional decentralization and greater participation of 
the producers in decision making on industry policies. In addition, the proposal asked for a 
change of its legal status, from a government organization to a public non-governmental 
body.
37 On June 10, 1999, the draft bill for the creation of CONARROZ was submitted to 
Congress. The objective was to create a corporate organization similar to other agricultural 
                                                 
36 These rights changed after 1994, when the country ratified the Uruguay Round (Law 7473, Implementation 
of the UR Agreements). 
37 Congress files, Nº 13628. 
  61organizations in the country.
38 On May 23, 2002, CONARROZ was created (Law 8285), 
with a public non-governmental legal status and its own equity.  
Article 40 of Law 8265 grants CONARROZ the exclusive right of importing paddy 
rice with zero tariffs. Therefore, when imports are required for satisfying national demand, 
the government grants monopolistic tariff-free import rights to CONARROZ.
39  
The debate on the creation of CONARROZ took more than two years. The original 
draft bill was presented by a congressman of the National Liberation  Party (PLN), then the 
government opposition party.
40  The main opposing actions against the creation of 
CONARROZ came from public and private organizations, including the National 
Federation of Consumers Associations (FENASCO), the Commission for the Promotion of 
Competition (COPROCOM), the Libertarian Movement Party (PML), and the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade (COMEX).
41  
The common opposition from these actors was against the exclusiveness granted to 
CONARROZ to import rice with zero tariffs, which contradicted the principle of free 
competition and affected consumer welfare. Ironically, another actor that opposed the bill 
was the Rice Office, since its responsibilities were going to be transferred to CONARROZ 
(Table 5).  
The strongest support for the approval of Law 8265 came from the National 
Association of Rice Millers (ANINSA) and the National Chamber of Rice Producers. Both 
organizations were successful in obtaining two key results: the monopolistic right granted 
to CONARROZ for free rice imports and their participation in the regulation of producer 
prices. Other actors such as the National Council of Production (CNP), the National Office 
of Seeds, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) and the Ministry of the Economy (MEIC), 
wanted to maintain the roles and responsibilities that Law 7014 (the Rice Office) granted 
                                                 
38   Several agricultural industries have a public non-governmental corporate model that regulates all 
productive activity. For instance, LAICA (sugar cane), CORBANA (bananas), ICAFE (coffee), and 
CORFOGA (cattle). 
39 Tariffs on rice are 35 percent for milled rice and 20 percent for paddy rice. A combination of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) safeguards (AoA, Art. 5 and GATT, Art. 19) has raised import tariffs to 71 percent 
(Polo-Cheva et al., 2006). 
40 The former congressman is currently the rice producers’ representative on the board of CONARROZ. 
41 COPROCOM has been in favor of rice import liberalization and the elimination of price controls by the 
Ministry of the Economy (the Commission is an independent body at this ministry). Moreover, CONOPROM 
has opposed all agricultural corporations’ market controls.  
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them. Nevertheless, their influence in general was limited. Rice producers and millers 
gained strong political support in Congress, particularly from the PLN.  
Today, two draft bills put forth by the Libertarian Movement Party could change the 
present legal status of CONARROZ. The first bill intends to allocate part of the 
Corporation’s rents obtained through speculation with imports to fund public school 
cafeterias. The second bill is proposing the elimination of import tariffs on all food 
consumption goods, including rice.  
In November 2008, the Constitutional Court (Sala Cuarta) rejected the assertion of 
constitutional inconsistencies in the CONARROZ law, made by the National Association 
of Free Consumers in 2003. The main arguments of the Association were that consumers’ 
rights were being violated and a private monopoly was being created by law. The Court 
ordered that a representative of a consumers rights association sit on CONARROZ’s board 
of directors.42 
 
42 The board of CONARROZ consists of twelve representatives (five from producers, five from millers, and 
two from the government, from MAG and MEIC). CONARROZ is currently chaired by a representative of 
the rice millers. Between 2002 and 2006 (the Pacheco Administration), the president was a representative of 
the rice producers.   
 
Table 5. Distributive Politics Spreadsheet: Creation of CONARROZ (Law 8285, 2002) 
 
  Benefits from Supporting  Ability to Generate Political Action  Prediction 
  Main Objectives (Incentives)  Number  Resources  Number  Resources  Magnitude  Per Capita 
Supporting Interests              
National Production 
Council (CNP) 
To maintain its role and 
responsibilities in the 
organization of the rice sector. 
n.a. n.a.  Low Low  Low  Low
National Office of Seeds 
(part of MAG) 
To continue the coordination of 
policies and programs for the 
rice sector. 
n.a. n.a.  Low Low  Low  Low
Ministry of Agriculture 
(MAG) 
To continue its mandate of 
supporting the development of 
the agricultural sector of the 
country. 
n.a. n.a.  Low  Medium  Low  Low
National Association of 
Rice Millers (ANINSA) 
Control over the imports of rice.  High  High Low High Low High
National Chamber of 
Rice Producers 
Tariff protection from rice 
imports. Closer participation in 
rice policy design, particularly 
on price regulation. 
High High Low High Low High




To maintain its discretion on rice 
chain price regulation and the 
approval of rice imports for 
national consumption. 
n.a. n.a.  Low High Low Medium 
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Table 5., continued 
 
  Benefits from Supporting  Ability to Generate Political Action  Prediction 
  Main Objectives (Incentives)  Number  Resources  Number  Resources  Magnitude  Per Capita 
Opposing Interests              
Rice Office  To maintain its participation in 
the regulation of prices, imports 
and exports, quality, and 
marketing of rice. 
High High Low Low  Low  Low
Ministry of Foreign 
Trade (COMEX) 
The use of a rice import 
mechanism that guarantees the 
transparency and open access to 
all interested companies (in case 
of demand shortage, in 
accordance with Decree 2872 on 
import quotas for agricultural 
goods). 
n.a. n.a.  Low High  Low  Low
National Federation of 
Consumers Associations 
(FENASCO) 
To protect consumers from 
monopolistic practices and 
higher rice prices. 
High High Low Low  High  Low




To avoid monopolistic practices 
and price regulations that affect 
consumers. 
n.a. n.a.  Low Low  Low  Low
Movimiento Libertario 
Party 
To promote free competition in 
the rice market. 
High High  Low  High  Low  Low
n.a. = not applicable 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on interviews with key actors, Congressional archives research and literature review, adapted from an analytical framework 
proposed by Baron (2003) 
 
 8.2. The Case for Policy Intervention 
 
In some cases, even if a market failure is not present (and thus efficiency is not the most 
important criterion for directing resource allocation), government intervention could be 
justified (Bozeman, 2002). For instance, when the main goal is to improve the poverty 
conditions of particular groups of households or increase income from traditional 
productive sectors, government policies could be necessary. Microeconomic efficiency 
ignores the distribution of income; thus, government interventions whose explicit objective 
is to redistribute income from one group of citizens to another to pursue a social goal could 
be justified, as long as they do not create additional distortions, negative welfare effects, or 
“second-best failures.”   
For instance, small farmers in developing countries could obtain temporary 
incentives to overcome productivity limitations. In this case, however, investing in 
irrigation infrastructure, modern seed varieties, transportation infrastructure, extension 
services, environmental management, systems and research and development (seed 
improvement, pest tolerance, nutritional value), appear to be the most coherent incentives 
to achieve higher farm productivity, sufficient production, and lower prices for consumers 
in the long run.     
If food price stability for consumers (particularly for poorer households) is a policy 
goal, trade protectionism is an inefficient policy that creates important distortions and 
suboptimal outcomes, particularly in agricultural markets of developing countries. The 
theory and empirical evidence is clear in pointing out the need to identify the sources of 
productive limitations and competitive disadvantages from agricultural producers in 
developing nations, and to allocate resources and direct policies to correct directly those 
obstacles that impede productivity improvements. Historically, protectionist measures and 
other support mechanisms (i.e., price controls, input markets monopoly) in agriculture have 
been the result of interest group actions (large farmers) that seek specific rents, and do not 
benefit original or expected beneficiaries (small farmers and poor households).
43 
Another widely used argument for government intervention in agricultural markets 
is related to food security. The concept of food security has evolved during the last three 
decades. Currently, the widely accepted World Food Summit (1996) definition includes 
                                                 
43 Schultz (1987), Bhagwati (1991), López and Herrera (2005). 
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 food access, availability, food use, and stability (FAO, 2006).
44 From a policy perspective, 
two broad options have generally been followed by developing countries to achieve 
adequate levels of food security:
45  
 
•  Food self-sufficiency or the provision of a level of food supplies from 
national resources above that implied by free trade. While this approach 
implies the provision of sufficient domestic production to meet a 
substantial part of national demand, it does not necessarily imply that all 
households in the country have access to all the food they require. In 
many countries which are net food exporters, substantial numbers of 
households are suffering from malnutrition. 
•  Food  self-reliance or a set of policies where the sources of food are 
determined by international trade patterns and the benefits and risks 
associated with it. This strategy has become more common as global 
trade has become freer. It is even argued that improved food security, as 
well as efficiency gains, may be achieved more satisfactorily, even in 
countries where agriculture remains a major contributor to GDP, by 
shifting resources into the production of non-food export crops and 
importing staple food requirements. 
 
According to Johnston (1996), countries should take advantage of international 
markets to ensure food security. Trade encourages the efficient transfer of food supplies 
from surplus areas to others where there are deficits. Therefore, free trade helps developing 
countries to become self-reliant instead of wasting scarce resources trying to become self-
sufficient. 
 
   
                                                 
44 “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” (World 
Food Summit, 1996). The definition was redefined in 2002: “Food security [is] a situation that exists when all 
people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that 
meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” (FAO, 2002). 
45 FAO (2003). 
  678.3. Institutional Setting 
 
The current institutional setting of rice promotion is described in Figure 8. Notwithstanding 
the leading policy, implementation, and monitoring role of the Ministry of the Economy, 
CONARROZ and other private organizations of the rice producers have significant 
influence on policy decisions. The accountability actions of the Comptroller General are 
important but not sufficient to influence a clearer implementation of the policy. Consumer 
protection organizations (both public and private) lobby in favor of rice market openness 
and consumer benefits, with limited impact on rice policy.  
 
Figure 10. Institutional Setting of Rice Promotion 
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8.4. Policy Outcomes and Conclusions 
 
Generally speaking, the agricultural sector in Costa Rica is a dual one. On the one hand, 
non-traditional export activities have grown steadily in the last 20 years, mainly as a result 
of incentives and support policies from the government. On the other, traditional agriculture 
saw its productive support measures significantly reduced. The remaining most relevant 
policy instrument for traditional agriculture has been import tariff protection, on so called 
  68“sensitive” agricultural imports like rice, beans, poultry, sugar, and dairy products.
46 In the 
case of rice, price controls and the hedge fund managed by CONARROZ are important 
additional support instruments.  
Rice is the main staple food in Costa Rica for more than 4 million people. It is an 
important source of calories and protein (22 percent of total calories and 16 percent of 
protein intake), and accounts for 8 percent of the total basic food basket cost in Costa Rica 
(Polo-Cheva et al., 2006). According to FAOSTAT (2006), the country’s per capita 
consumption is 57 kg annually, second in Latin America and close to Japan and South 
Korea’s levels. 
At the same time, rice has been one of the most heavily supported commodities. The 
support measures for rice production in Costa Rica have been estimated using the OECD’s 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) methodology.
47 Rice producer support in Costa Rica (45 
percent) is greater than in the United States (31 percent) and the European Union (32 
percent) and, excluding Japan and South Korea, close to the OECD average (Todd et al., 
2004; OECD, 2006).  
Rice is also one of the commodities most protected from international competition 
in Costa Rica. Although original tariffs were 35 percent for milled rice and 20 percent for 
paddy rice, due to the combination of various World Trade Organization (WTO) safeguards 
(AoA Art 5. and GATT Art. 19), they were increased to 71 percent. In addition, sanitary 
and quality inspection fees for imported rice were raised from US$9.86/MT to US$19/MT, 
which is a non-tariff barrier to trade inconsistent with WTO rules.  
The local producers’ lobbying activities for protection are effective. The case of rice 
sector protection negotiation under DR-CAFTA is not an exception. To address 
“asymmetrical development” and transition issues, the rice sector of Costa Rica obtained a 
lengthy tariff phase-out schedule (20 years) in the Agreement.
48 Stewart (2007) estimated 
the social impact of the tariff phase-out period obtained by rice producers as part of the DR-
CAFTA negotiations. The author reports a present value of US$895 million from welfare 
loss and inefficiencies in resource allocation due to the extended period of tariff protection 
                                                 
46 According to CGR (2004b), rice is a sensitive product because of its relevance for national nutrition, its 
importance for poor household consumption, and market concentration in a few companies.  
47 PSE include market price supports, payments based on output, input subsidies, fixed capital formation, on-
farm services, and other non-production supports (OECD, 2006). 
48 Condo et al. (2005). 
  69elimination. In addition, the net present value of income transfers from consumers to rice 
producers is estimated at US$428 million. 
Rice prices are fixed at every level of the supply chain. For years, and since the 
creation of CONARROZ, domestic prices have been higher than world prices, affecting 
consumers and poorer households in particular. Trejos et al. (2007) report an 8 percent 
increase in the total basic food basket because of higher local prices compared to 
international CIF prices in a small group of agricultural foods alone (rice, poultry, dairy, 
sugar). Umaña and Figueroa (2002) estimated that tariff protection of agricultural goods 
creates a burden of 17.5 percent of the income of the poorest 20 percent families in the 
country. 
From another perspective, Petrecolla (2006) found that from 1995 to 2005, Costa 
Rican consumers have transferred US$396 million to rice producers. The impact of this 
transfer on the poorest households represents between 7 percent and 8 percent of their per 
capita income, which contrasts with the burden on the richest households (0.4 percent to 0.6 
percent).  
The premise of CONARROZ was that a mechanism was needed to protect national 
producers from adverse international prices and improve local conditions. Local rice 
production has been decreasing since 2000.
49 At the same time, productivity did not 
increase, remaining around 4 tons per hectare.
50 This result contrasts with the original goals 
of CONARROZ, to create support mechanisms for local production growth and 
productivity improvement. When compared to a leading world rice producer such as the 
United States, Costa Rica has been losing competitiveness for more than a decade, while 
other countries have increased productivity significantly.
51 
At the same time, rice imports have been growing, which is a logical result of lower 
international prices. In order to import rice, after 2002 the government lowered the tariff to 
zero and gave monopolistic import rights to CONARROZ. Since then, this Corporation has 
been importing rice through this mechanism and cashing in monopolistic rents. For instance, 
in 2005-2006, 60 percent of total supply was imported. 
                                                 
49 This tendency started many years ago, when traditional crops lands were shifted to non-traditional export 
crops or other productive activities with higher returns.   
50 Authors’ estimates with data from MercaNET-CNP. 
51 Costa Rica’s rice imports, with some exceptions, come almost entirely from the United STates. 
  70CONARROZ sells the imported rice to the mills as if they had paid the whole tariff. 
The rent perceived (US$6.7 million in 2004) is transferred to producers which in most 
cases are also millers. The rent is then assigned by quantity produced. As a result, 33 
producers received 50 percent of the import rents, while 773 producers received just 13 
percent (Polo-Cheva et al., 2006). A report by the Comptroller General published in 2004 
indicated several problems with the use of the hedge fund managed by CONARROZ. The 
central conclusion was that the original objectives of improving rice productivity were not 
being addressed at all (CGR, 2004a). 
The problems with rice policy in Costa Rica have not changed since then. 
Productivity remains unchanged, and many small producers have been displaced from the 
market. Moreover, in 2007-2008, due to the exponential growth of international rice prices 
(a “counterfactual” situation not present before), all of the limitations of the current policy 
were accentuated. In 2008 national production increased, more because of clear market 
signals (higher prices) than other support measures. In addition, consumer prices have 
grown significantly, in spite of the availability of the hedge fund managed by CONARROZ 
to compensate for strong price fluctuations. In future years, the final assessment will come, 
depending on the movement of international rice prices. 
Rice protectionism in Costa Rica is the result of successful tariff- and rent- seeking 
activities by well-organized farmers, and the unclear and misplaced government concern 
over the potential negative effects of trade liberalization on small farmers and consumers. 
Instead of pursuing a sound productive development policy for the sector (with technology 
upgrading, irrigation infrastructure investments and water resources management programs, 
R&D, pests control analysis, and soil degradation control, among others), the main PDP 
targeting rice producers and millers has been import protection (through tariff and non-
tariff barriers) and price controls. Both instruments have been unsuccessful in improving 
productivity. They have also created significant rents for rice millers through speculation, 
transferred significant income from consumers to producers, and maintained local prices 
above international prices for years.  
The protection of rice production in Costa Rica seems to be a clear case of “second-
best failures” or unsuccessful PDPs, incoherent in terms of sustainability and contradictory 
to its original objectives of food security and social returns. In spite of their “good 
  71intentions,” PDPs designed to support one segment of the economy (the rice sector) have 
led to a dramatic loss of competitiveness and costly damage to the natural resource base. 
Much of this costly environmental damage goes unaccounted for in policy evaluation and 
rice farm productive strategy.
52 
The main beneficiaries of agricultural protectionism in Costa Rica have traditionally 
been medium and large farmers and those whose primary source of income is not 
agriculture (Corrales, 1985; Figueroa and Umaña, 2002; Celis, 2007). For instance, 
Figueroa and Umaña (2002) suggest that small rice farmers without access to irrigation 
infrastructure (even with tariff protection) are not competitive, while large farmers that 
have access to irrigation could compete with international prices and therefore do not 
require import protection.  
 
8.5. Recommendations for PDP Improvement 
 
The main recommendation for rice policy improvements are: 
•  Conduct an impact evaluation of CONARROZ, from an economic, social and 
environmental perspective. 
•  Eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to the imports of rice. 
•   Eliminate price regulations for rice. 
•  Enforce Law 8285 and effectively allocate CONARROZ’s resources to projects that 
help improve the productivity of rice production. 
•  Create public-private partnerships between government organizations and rice 
producers in order to strengthen competitive advantages of the rice sector. Any 
support mechanisms should be conditioned on producers’ performance and real 
business capacity. 
•  In the case of low-productivity rice farmers, policies to shift resources to alternative 
high income elasticity agricultural production activities should be promoted.   
•  Support temporary subsidies for poor households (consumers) with CONARROZ’s 
hedge funds in periods when international prices are steadily growing.  
 
                                                 
52 More than 60 percent of national rice production comes from the Tempisque River Basin (TRB) area. 
Abundant water has been used in an unsustainable way by rice producers. In addition, soil nutrient depletion 
and intensive fertilizer use have generated important environmental impacts (Arezzo, 2001; OET, 2005).  
  729.  Lessons Learned 
 
Productive Development Policies (PDPs) are necessary to improve productivity. When 
correctly designed and dimensioned, PDPs can effectively impact economic growth and 
development. The five case studies analyzed indicate that addressing the arguments for 
policy intervention and incorporating the results of the evaluation into policy design and 
reform are necessary steps for success.  
The main lessons learned from the present study are the following: 
 
•  The present study of PDPs in Costa Rica suggests, from a theoretical 
perspective, the presence of market failures that would justify 
government intervention in all cases, with the exception of rice 
protection, under particular assumptions.  
•  From a policy design and implementation point of view, policymakers 
did not make a clear case that market failures had occurred. 
•  In all cases, except for the PROPYME program, government failures 
appear to be the main reason for policy intervention.  
•  Market failures are not being optimally addressed in any case. However, 
there is room for institutional improvements that could contribute to the 
correction of such market failures (Table 6).   
•  The political economy analysis suggests the existence of interest groups 
supporting PDPs and their eventual reform. In fact, strong opposition to 
changes in the status quo was identified only in the case of rice 
protection. Notwithstanding, the question arises, why PDP reform for 
productivity improvement has not materialized in the case of Costa Rica. 
Possible explanations for this outcome are: 
 
o  The lack of a clear identification of market and government failures for 
public intervention, and the limited understanding of appropriate policy 
instruments to address those failures optimally. 
o  The focus on accounting procedures instead of accountability mechanisms in 
most public institutions does not create institutional incentives for the 
implementation of a monitoring and impact evaluation system for PDPs. 
  73o  The absence of a sound monitoring and impact evaluation system in each 
PDP (with a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis) impedes the creation of 
knowledge for policymakers to adjust and improve the implementation of 
PDPs.
53  
o  The limited leadership at the highest political level and weak coordination 
among agencies and with other PDPs, might prevent the enactment of 
reforms that would improve policy performance and outcomes. 
 
Table 6. Costa Rica: PDPs Assessment Summary 
PDP  Policy Justification 





Institutional Setting Needs 
Export Diversification 
and FDI Attraction: 
Export Processing Zones 
Government Failure 
No Market Failure (Origins) 




Leadership at highest 
political level with stronger 
coordination with other PDPs 
Technology Transfer: 
Backward Linkages 









Widening of program scope 
and stronger coordination 
with other PDPs 









Improvements in program 
implementation and stronger 











Coherence of PDP goals 
Leadership at highest 
political level with stronger 
coordination with other PDPs 
Food Security and 
Agricultural Protection: 
The Case of Rice 
 





Elimination of import 
monopoly and trade barriers 
Program focus only on 
productivity improvements 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
                                                 
53 An impact evaluation system seeks to answer questions like: How did the PDP affect the beneficiaries (for 
instance, productivity)? Were any improvements a direct result of the PDP, or would they have happened 
anyway? Could PDP design be modified to improve impact? Are resources being spent efficiently? See Baker 
(2000) for a comprehensive approach.  
  7410.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Generally speaking, most PDPs in Costa Rica have emphasized selected interventions, 
narrow sector policies, and targeted instruments, rather than addressing global 
disadvantages in the country’s business climate. Improvement in key areas (e.g., 
infrastructure, technology, business regulations, and market distortions) to enhance 
competitiveness and create the required conditions for productivity growth is a policy 
objective still in process, with positive outcomes but important limitations so far. 
None of the PDPs analyzed are addressing market failures optimally. Still, three of 
them (EPZs, CRP, and sustainable tourism) show positive policy outcomes. On the other 
hand, rice protectionism generates negative outcomes (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11. Costa Rica: PDPs and Policy Outcomes 

























            




































            
 








Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
  
  75This study has shown that government failures rather than market failures are the 
main justification for PDPs in Costa Rica. Even in the presence of market failures, the 
instruments applied in the policy design are not necessarily the most efficient (according to 
economic theory), but are the most politically feasible options (lower political cost). 
Moreover, lack of policy evaluation and monitoring prevents the required adjustments and 
corrections of such policies in accordance with changing circumstances. 
The design and implementation of industrial policy should be based on a sound, 
formal, and well-documented analysis of market failures, rather than ideological beliefs or a 
new development planning euphoria. In the case of Costa Rica, a good start could be to 
optimally address government failures, removing those policies that created them or 
adjusting the instruments and scope of current PDPs, subject to the condition of achieving 
the most efficient use and allocation of resources.  
The study identified a lot of different organizations that carry out a wide variety of 
programs, with little or no coordination among them. This situation naturally raises the 
question of whether better coordination might not be one of the key elements that would 
result in better PDP performance. Given that coordination failures among main actors and 
other relevant PDPs exist, further study of the main causes of this situation is warranted, as 
well as a comprehensive analysis of potential areas, actors, and political support for policy 
reform.  
It would be important to consider an umbrella approach in the case of those policies 
that could reinforce and create feedback channels between each other. In order to achieve 
this objective, more institutional coordination at the administrative level is required. The 
creation of a national council on innovation, competitiveness and growth policy (NCICG) 
is a necessary step in this regard. The council should be led by the president of the country, 
following the successful experience of leading countries such as Finland, Ireland, and 
Singapore. A key task for this council would be the identification and removal of existing 
obstacles to good policy coordination. The NCICG should incorporate representatives from 
business, academia, and civil society organizations. 
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Appendix Table 1 List of Interviewees 
Company/Organization  Responsibility  Name 
BAXTER  Plant Manager  Chester Zelaya 
INTEL CR  Plant Manager  Karla Blanco 
PENN UNITED  Quality Engineer  Marcio Enamorado 
ETIPRES Accounting  Manager  Esmeralda  Solera 
PLASTIPOL  Technical Manager  Roberto Vásquez 
TECNIBANDAS  General Manager  Luis Gustavo Monge 
SERPIMETAL  General Manager  Carlo Magno 
INSE President  Anselmo  Sánchez 
HS METALMECANICA  Production Manager  Herman Salas 
AKA PRECISION  General Manager  Angela García León 
LITOGRAFIA MORAVIA  Sales Manager  Jorge Quesada 
FEMA  President  Luis Fernando Masís 
FORTECH General  Manager Guillermo  Pereira 
HOSPIRA Plant  Manager  Isaías  González 
Hewlett Packard  Accounting Manager  Paul Sánchez 
KINETOS  General Manager  Mario Feoli Escalante 
TURRONES DE COSTA RICA  Sales Manager  Alberto Soto 
MAFAM General  Manger Vanesa  Gamboa 
FLOREX Vice-President  Silvia  Chávez 
DELISABOR  General Manager  Luis Diego Alfaro 
ASOMETAL General  Manager  Angela García León 
CORAAL General  Manager  Angela García León 
Chamber of Industries  Project Director  Guillermo Velásquez 
MAFAM  Sales Manager  Harold Ortiz 
PROCOMER Former  General  Manager  Eduardo  Alonso 
CINDE  Executive Manager  Gabriela Llobet 
AZOFRAS Director  Timmothy  Scott 
COMEX  Investment Director  Marvin Rodríguez 
CR Provee  Director  Roberto Calvo 
GLOBAL PARK  General Manager  Carlos Wong 
CINDE  Former Executive Manager  Anabel Gónzalez 
CINDE  Former Director  Richard Beck 
CONICIT  Executive Manager  Alejandra Araya 
CONICIT  Legal Advisor  Alfonso Chacón Mata 
Central Bank of Costa Rica  Former President  Eduardo Lizano 
National Association of Consumers  President  Juan Ricardo Fernández 
ANINSA President  Eduardo  Rojas 
CONARROZ President Eduardo  Rojas 
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National Chamber of Rice Producers President  Oscar Campos 
Ministry of the Economy  Vice Minister   Eduardo Sibaja 
Ministry of Agriculture  Vice Minister  Carlos Villalobos 
PRUGAM  Former Director  Luis López 
Costa Rican Tourism Institute  Director of Tourism Advisory  Walter Monge Edwards 
National Chamber of Tourism  President  Gonzalo Vargas 
Costa Rican Tourism Professionals 
Association President  Carlos  Lizama 
Commission for the Promotion of 
Competition (COPROCOM)  Executive Director  Ana Victoria Velázquez 
ProDesarrollo Internacional  Director  Rafael Celis 
 
 
 
  